Modernism, Terrorism and Resurrection: Sub-state Nationalism in Spain by Truijens, T.S.
UNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN 
Modernism, terrorism and 
resurrection 
sub-state nationalism in Spain 
 
T.S. Truijens 
10-6-2014 
 
s0904457 
thomas.truijens@gmail.com 
Dr. M.S. Spirova 
 Second reader: Dr.  J.G. Erk 
Words: 23.278 
 
  
1 
 
Content 
Maps ........................................................................................................................................................ 2 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4 
1.1 Puzzle & Question ......................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2. Plan of the thesis .......................................................................................................................... 6 
2.1. Nations, nationalism and the state ......................................................................................... 7 
2.2. Relative success ..................................................................................................................... 10 
3. Explaining sub-state nationalism:  the theory ............................................................................... 12 
3.1. The construction of national identity .................................................................................... 12 
3.2. Nationalist discourse ............................................................................................................. 13 
3.3. Symbolic frameworks ............................................................................................................ 15 
4. Operationalization ......................................................................................................................... 16 
5. Historical background:  Catalonia, The Basque country and Galicia ............................................. 19 
5.1. Catalonia ................................................................................................................................ 19 
5.2. The Basque country ............................................................................................................... 23 
5.3. Galicia .................................................................................................................................... 27 
6. Differences in strength and cohesiveness ..................................................................................... 31 
6.1. Language ............................................................................................................................... 31 
6.2. Print capitalism ...................................................................................................................... 34 
6.3. Subnational mobilization ....................................................................................................... 37 
6.3.1. Catalonia ........................................................................................................................ 37 
6.3.2. The Basque country ....................................................................................................... 40 
6.3.3. Galicia ............................................................................................................................ 43 
7. Discussion: explaining differences in strength and cohesiveness ................................................. 48 
7.1. National identity .................................................................................................................... 48 
7.2. Nationalist discourse ............................................................................................................. 50 
7.3. Symbolic expressions............................................................................................................. 52 
7.3.1. After the civil war: national memories of repression .................................................... 53 
8. Concluding remarks: past and future ............................................................................................ 56 
9. Literature ....................................................................................................................................... 58 
10. Appendix .................................................................................................................................... 61 
 
  
2 
 
Maps 
 
 
Map 1: Spain’s autonomous communities  
 
Map 2: Spain’s historic nationalities 
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Map 3: Spain’s non-Castilian languages 
 
Map 1 shows the administrative divisions of the 1978 Spanish constitution into autonomous 
communities. Map 2 specifies the historical nations. Map 3 shows the present diffusion of the 
languages of the three historical nationalities (Conversi, 2000, XV-XIV).  
4 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 1998 Kenneth Bollen en Juan Diez Medrano asked themselves a very straightforward question. 
“who are the Spaniards?” They claimed that although Spain is one of the oldest countries in Europe, 
it is a good example of incomplete nation building. The Basques, Catalans and Galicians are common 
examples of sub-state  nationalist movements in Spain to strengthen this claim. In their research they 
analyzed the sense of belonging to Spain and concluded that several regions do not feel as being a 
part of the nation called Spain (Bollen and Medrano, 1998, 605-608).  
There are several regionalist and nationalist movements operating within the possibilities of the 1978 
Spanish constitution.  This constitution recognized the right in the autonomous communities of the 
Basque country, Galicia, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and Valencia to use their own language as 
long as this doesn’t jeopardize the use of Castilian. During the 1980’s these autonomous 
governments used the possibilities to promote their regional languages (Bollen and Medrano, 1998, 
591). 
Of the regions with nationalist political parties, the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia are 
commonly mentioned as the three historical nationalist movements in Spain. Long before the 
constitution of 1978, these movements already had a nationalist character, claiming to represent a 
separate nation which deserved some status of autonomy or even aimed for separation.  These three 
movements will be the cases for a comparative study in this thesis for several reasons of which the 
first are related to practical matters such as availability of literature. However, the puzzle of this 
thesis essentially also entails the reasons for this case selection. The essence of this puzzle is that 
although these three historic movements have a lot in common, they differ substantially on several 
aspects, especially to what extent they have been successful. The aim of this thesis is to set up a 
framework for a scholarly literature based analysis of the possible explanations for these differences. 
This framework is based on theories about nationalism and sub-state nationalism and tries to assess 
the concept of a successful nationalist movement. 
The value and contribution of this thesis first lies within the detailed analysis of all three movements. 
Several scholars have presented arguments to explain the differences between the Basques and 
Catalans. These arguments were based on economic, structural, cultural and social explanations (see 
for example: Medrano 1994, Nili 2009, Desfor Edles 1999, Conversi  1997). This thesis also tries to fill 
the gap in scholarly literature by comparing all three historic nationalities. Especially concerning 
Galician nationalism related to the other two cases, there is substantial room for further 
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explorations. For the historical background of Galician nationalism in this thesis, I heavily rely on the 
works of Beswick (2007) and Nunez (1997). Thirdly, this thesis uses a model initially presented by 
Prerna Singh (2008) to establish the concept of a successful sub-state nationalist movement. This 
model can be used to compare several sub-state nationalist movements based on ordinal levels of 
success.  
 
1.1 Puzzle & Question 
The Catalans became a very successful sub-national movement for autonomy. They were the first to 
actually get recognition from the Spanish central government and are characterized among scholars 
as having a strong literary and cultural tradition. As Jordi Pujol stated: Language and culture… are the 
core elements of our identity as a people (Jordi Pujol, president of the Catalan Generalität, 1989). 
Popular support has always been broad for Catalanism (Balcells 1996, Payne 1975). 
 Basque nationalism on the other hand, lacked broad support, literary traditions or strong cultural 
markers. Basque nationalism claimed to be based on the idea that the Basques are the oldest race in 
Europe. They therefore state: Garean Garean Legez (Let us be what we were). Basque nationalism 
eventually led to terrorism by ETA, a terrorist movement related to the Basque nationalist party, 
which tried to achieve independence by creating a spiral of violence.   
Galician nationalism has a lot of similarities with both other regions, but nowadays cannot be 
characterized as strong in its regional nationalist expressions, since even during regional elections 
Galician nationalist parties do not dominate the state-wide parties. As Rosa Aneiros Stated, Galician 
culture is always on the edge, complaining about everything, and of course it does not make any long-
term plans, as it expects to die soon (Barreto, 2011, 385). 
Therefore the central puzzle of this thesis is the question why these three historic nationalist 
movements (which emerged under the same central government, in the same country, around the 
same time and with their own language and culture) have developed in three very distinct nationalist 
movements with different relative amounts of success?  The main research question in this thesis is 
thus: What explains the differences in success of these three nationalist movements? While 
answering this empirical question, this thesis will also show how the differences in success have 
contributed towards the characterization of these movements in words like modernism (Catalans) 
terrorism (Basques) and resurrection (Galicians). 
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1.2. Plan of the thesis 
 
This thesis takes a historical approach to explain how the emergence and evolution of three 
nationalist movements in Spain have influenced the extent to which they can be considered 
successful in recent decades. I will argue that Catalan nationalism has been most successful in the 
sense that it reflects a stronger and cohesive movement than Basque and Galician nationalism. The 
major reason for this success is that Catalan subnational mobilization was based on a pre-existing 
identity. Catalan nationalism gradually grew with a stable linguistic and cultural basis.  Basque 
nationalism on the other hand lacked this linguistic or cultural basis and adopted race and religion as 
bastions of their national identity from the beginning. Catalan nationalism spread amongst the 
people and the region due to its inclusive character, while Basque nationalism was used for 
exclusionary purposes and was always focused on the conflict between Basques and Spaniards. This 
symbolic conflict also led to increased fragmentation within Basque political representation. The 
Galicians initially had a linguistic basis, but the Galician language was never allowed to become the 
main driving force of nationalism, while at the same time, language was the most important element 
of identification.  
Chapter 2 will describe the main concepts used in this thesis and establish the differences between 
the nation, the state, nationalism and sub-state nationalism. I will also present a definition of what I 
consider to be a successful sub-state nationalist movement. In chapter 3 I will introduce the main 
theoretical arguments to explain the relative differences in success. Chapter 4 will operationalize a 
model to asses to what extent the three nationalist movements have been successful. Chapter 5 will 
present the historical background of the three cases. This historical background covers the earliest 
years in which the first roots of the nationalist movements emerged  until the end of Franco’s 
dictatorship (1936-1975), in which all nationalist aspiration where suppressed by the national 
government. Chapter 6 will establish the differences in strength and cohesiveness between the three 
nationalist movements. This chapter is divided between differences in strength of language and print 
capitalism and the extent to which the nationalist movements successfully mobilized political support 
after Franco’s dictatorship and the transition towards Spanish democracy in 1978. In chapter 7 I will 
explain the relative differences in success based on the theoretical arguments from chapter 3. 
Chapter 8 contains the concluding remarks.
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2. Concepts 
 
2.1. Nations, nationalism and the state 
The start of thesis should make a basic conceptual distinction between nation, state, nationalism and 
sub-state nationalism. By “state”, I take Weber's definition, referring to “a human community that 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. For the concept 
of the “nation” Guibernau  refers to a “human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a 
common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past  and a common 
project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself” (Guibernau, 2003, 4). Thus, in his view, the 
“nation” includes five dimensions: psychological (consciousness of forming a group), cultural, 
territorial, political and historical. By this definition, Guibernau distinguishes the term nation from 
both the state and the nation-state (2003, 3-4). When a state and a nation are overlapping, we 
generally speak of the nation-state, but this is not always the case.  
Nations without states exist, meaning that in spite of having their territories included within the 
boundaries of one or more states, they maintain a separate sense of national identity. When nations 
without states develop a movement which articulates the explicit wish to rule themselves, we speak 
of sub-state nationalism (Guibernau, 2003, 3-4). Sub-state nationalism in turn is a concept derived 
from the bigger notion of nationalism. 
By “nationalism” I mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a 
set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common political 
destiny (Guibernau, 2003, 5). Nationalism locates the source of identity within a people, which is 
seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity. 
The only foundation of nationalism is thus an idea. Nationalism is a particular perspective or style of 
thought.  At the core of nationalism lies the idea of a nation (Greenfeld, 1992, 4). 
In 1983 Benedict Anderson famously proposed the following definition of the Nation: it is an 
imagined community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson, 1992, 6). All 
nations are, according to Anderson, imagined communities because even in the smallest nation on 
earth, it is practically impossible that everybody knows each other. However, they do somehow feel 
connected as members of the same communion. Consequently, Gellner stated that following this 
definition, the concept of nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness, but 
nationalism invents nation where they do not exist (Anderson, 1992, 6).  Nations are also limited 
because even the largest nations in the world don’t place themselves on a conterminous level with 
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mankind. Every nation has certain boundaries where other nations begin.  The nation is a community 
because it is always portrait as a deep horizontal comradeship. A limited imagination for which 
millions of people have proven to be willing to kill or die for (Anderson, 1992, 7).  
Keating states we can see nationalism as a principle of self-determination. However, the group with 
the right to self-determination may be defined in several ways. This group for example doesn’t 
necessarily have to be living in one state and consequently form a nation-state. Nowadays, there are 
several examples of proclaimed nations, which are operating at the sub-state level. They strive for 
territorial reconstruction and are engaged in a process of nation-building within a state. They aim for 
a reconstruction of the political space both on the institutional level and in civil society. This is what 
Keating calls stateless nation-building (Keating, 1997, 693-694).  This new form of nationalism, rooted 
in historic traditions and identities, has re-emerged nationalism as a vital principle of identity. Spain 
constitutes a very special case for the analysis of this kind of nationalism because this single country 
has to deal with several pro-claimed separate nations within its borders.  
Guibernau (2003) stresses the specific distinction between “state nationalism” and nationalism in 
“nations without states”. He claims this distinction is necessary to understand some of the key 
specific features of these different types of nationalism. These have nothing to do with a value 
judgment or a claim that one type of nationalism is “good” and the other is “bad”. The fundamental 
differences between “state nationalism” and nationalism in “nations without states” are twofold. The 
first difference is their different access to power and resources. Nations without states do not have a 
government with the legitimate monopoly on the use of physical force within its territory.  The 
second difference stresses the fact that state nationalism seeks to  consolidate and strengthen the 
state, while sub-state nationalism or nations without states challenge the legitimacy of the state and 
often, but not always, seeks to construct a new state (Guibernau, 2003, 5). This thesis is concerned 
with the kind of nationalism of nations without states. However, theoretical arguments based on the 
broader concept of state nationalism can be used to explain nationalism of nations without states 
since sub-state nationalism is a theoretical subtype of the broader concept of state nationalism. 
Singh (2008) conceptualizes the concept of sub-state nationalism by clarifying the “kind hierarchy“ 
between the concepts of subnationalism1, nationalism and a political community. She uses Sartori’s 
ladder of generality and describes how we find the concept of political community, widely described 
as a political amalgamation characterized by a “we-feeling”, on the highest rung of the ladder.  Below 
the concept of political community lies the root concept of nationalism, which is a “we-feeling on a 
                                                          
1
 In this thesis, the concepts of sub-state nationalism and subnationalism are used intertwined based on the 
chosen words by the several scholars, but refer to the same concept. 
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state level. Moving down the ladder we find the concept of subnationalism, a classical sub-type of 
nationalism (Singh, 2008, 2). Subnationalism is theoretically identical to nationalism and can be 
distinguished from other classical subtypes such as supra-nationalism. The difference however, just 
as Guibernau (2003) argues, is in the desire for political control. In the case of nationalism this desire 
is focused on the political control of a territorial homeland and a desire for sovereign statehood. 
Subnationalism manifests itself in the aspiration for an independent homeland or the pursuit of 
greater autonomy within an existing political framework. Subnationalism is thus a “we-feeling” below 
the level of the nation-state (Singh, 2008, 3). Theoretical arguments to explain the broader concept 
of nationalism can thus be used to explain its subtypes such as subnationalism or supranationalism, 
while keeping in mind the substantial differences in the goals and aspirations of the different types 
and subtypes of nationalism. 
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2.2. Relative success 
 
The first conceptual challenge for this thesis is to be able to claim that nationalist movements A has 
been or is more successful then nationalist movement B. For the comparison between the Basques, 
Catalans and Galicians, it isn’t necessary to be able to claim that for example the Catalans have been 
more successful than the Basques in a numerical sense. For the comparison in this thesis, we do 
however want to be able to make claims on an ordinal level. We have to be able to say that the 
Catalans where more or less successful.  
To establish a concept of success, we must ask ourselves what subnational movements are striving 
for and when we can consider a subnational movement to be successful. There can be substantial 
differences between the goals of two subnational movements. As Medrano states: “The difference 
between Basque and Catalan nationalists is that the Basques want to leave Spain, and the Catalans 
want to run it” (Medrano, 1995, 190). A nationalist movement can strive for autonomy or complete 
separation. Sub-state national minorities demand a degree of political autonomy on the basis of a 
claim to represent a distinct and separate demos. Lluch (2012) describes how internal variations can 
exist between subnational movements. These are mostly based on orientations towards 
secessionism or non-secessionism. He analyzes three political orientations: Independentism, 
autonomism or federalism. Some nationalist movements thus seek their own state, others are aiming 
for a special autonomous status within the constitution or their objective is to become a constituent 
unit within a federation. The three types of subnationalism thus agree on the idea of an existing 
nation, but they disagree on the amount of autonomy this nation should have (Lluch, 2012, 434-435). 
Every nationalist movement first of all needs to identify its people and create enough popular 
support. A sub-state nationalist movement can hardly be called a successful movement when for 
example only 5 percent of the inhabitants of the province of Catalonia adhere to nationalist 
principles or identify themselves as Catalans next to, or instead of Spanish. Therefore, the most 
important indicator of the success of a subnational movement is the extent to which the nationalist 
movement represents a cohesive group with popular support for the idea of what Andersons called 
the ‘imagined’ nation. The cohesiveness of the imagined group and the amount of popular support 
for the representation of this group will be the main focus for the concept of relative success in this 
thesis. Based on a model first developed by Singh (2008), I will analyze the idea and the strength of 
the imagined nation, leaving out possible differences between reaching either independence, 
autonomy or a federal status as Lluch (2012) describes. 
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Singh (2008) constructs the concept of subnationalism as a three-level concept. The basic level or the 
background concept is subnationalism. The secondary level is constituted by a sense of belonging, 
the we-feeling, which is the core concept running through the ladder of political community, 
nationalism and subnationalism as described earlier in this thesis. According to Singh, the idea of this 
sense of belonging is a key concept for any social development (Singh, 2008, 3).  The elements which 
constitute the thick concept of subnationalism are based on signals which can be used to identify a 
sense of collective identity. Such elements are a myth of common origin, a common culture, 
language, print capitalism and national consciousness (Singh, 2008, 4-5). In order to conduct 
comparative research, Singh distils what she calls a thin concept of subnationalism. These choices of 
elements for the thin concept of subnationalism are not driven by theoretical judgments but merely 
by practical matters such as observability and availability of data. The indicators Language, Print 
capitalism, and Subnational mobilization are used to establish the strength and cohesiveness of the 
nationalist movement, and conversely asses to what extent the nationalist movements have been 
successful in representing a cohesive group with popular support for what Anderson calls the 
imagined nation. Chapter 4 will describe how I operationalize this concept of relative success. 
 
 
Figure 1: Indicators of relative success 
  
Relative succes: 
Strength and 
cohesiveness of 
the nationalist 
movements 
Indicator 1: 
Language 
Indicator 2: 
Print 
capitalism 
Indicator 3: 
subnational 
mobilization 
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3. Explaining sub-state nationalism:  the theory 
 
The explanation of the differences in relative success of the three nationalist movements will be 
based on theoretical arguments proposed by several scholars. These theoretical arguments can 
roughly be characterized by the following factors: The construction of national identity, nationalist 
discourse and symbolic frameworks. However, these three theoretical arguments are strongly 
connected as will be shown in the following sections. Together they provide us with a significant 
amount of ammunition to explain some of the differences in strength and cohesiveness of the three 
nationalist movements under study. The purpose of these factors is also to provide a theoretical 
framework in which we can find the possible explanations for the differences in success in a 
coordinated fashion. These three theoretical arguments can be used to explain the weakness and 
strength of the three indicators of success as described in the previous chapter: Language, Print 
capitalism and Subnational mobilization.  
3.1. The construction of national identity  
 
Every sub-state nationalist movement starts with the identification of its national identity. Greenfeld 
(1992) argues that nationalism is not related to membership in all human communities, but only in 
those communities defined as nations. National identity is different from an identity based on 
religion or class, nor is it the same as a linguistic or territorial identity, nor is it the same as a political 
identity of any kind. However, these kinds of identities can have their influence on the formation of 
the national identity. Unique identities can frequently be traced back centuries before the 
emergence of the national identity, but the presence of any kind of unique identity is no reason for 
anticipating the emergence of a national identity.  National identity is not a generic identity, but it is 
specific. Generating an identity may be a psychological necessity, a natural process for human 
nature, but generating a national identity is not (Greenfeld, 1992, 12). 
An essential characteristic of identity is that it is based on the view that the concerned actor has of 
him or herself. Identity therefore is a perception. If a particular identity doesn’t mean anything to the 
population in question, this particular population doesn’t have this identity.  In ethnic nationalism, 
nationality can become the synonym of ethnicity and the national identity is often perceived as a 
reflection or awareness of the possession of inherited group characteristics. These components of 
ethnicity can be language, customs, territorial affiliations or even physical aspects. Such objective 
ethnicity however does not represent an identity. The national identity of the nation depends on 
what characteristics the people perceive to be the source of their uniqueness and distinctiveness. 
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Ethnicity is frequently used to constitute a national identity, but ethnicity in itself doesn’t necessarily 
constitute nationality. Ethnic characteristics form a certain category of building stones which can be 
organized and rendered meaningful, becoming the elements of any number of identities (Greenfeld, 
1992, 12-13). 
Identity is not just a simple form of inherent self-awareness. It is a social construct and therefore 
subject to change. Our perception regarding who we are as individuals is first of all largely focused 
upon the recognition and appreciation of our origins. The idea of a myth of a common origin thus 
entails a perception of where we come from and what we share within a community as a whole 
(Beswick, 2007, 32). The notion of a common ancestral heritage might thus be one of the 
components of identity, but specific cultural traits, language and any form of social organization are 
also pertinent (Beswick, 2007, 33). A sense of solidarity between people will emerge if they share the 
same positive attitudes towards their particular expressions of identity and language. Especially 
language can present an ethnic group with a strong incentive to feel connected since it connects the 
present with the past through its oral tradition, literary forms, music and history. When these 
attitudes towards language and culture are combined with regional and social stereotypes, a strong 
group sense of identity can emerge (Beswick, 2007, 34). 
Common elements chosen as core values can work both as mobilizing symbols and as a point of 
reference for a wide platform. The lack of available cultural markers like language can force a 
nationalist movement to look for other instruments of identity formation.  In this case, the group will 
be forced to rely on an antagonistic identity, which is constructed essentially through the opposition 
of the in-groups to one or more out-groups. This antagonistic identity focuses more on the need to 
define one’s own identity trough negative comparisons to others, which results in an exclusive 
character (Conversi, 1997, 5).  
All nationalist movements first task is to identify its people and their collective identity. To mobilize 
them, a sense of self-confidence has to be instilled, but for this to occur, the nation must 
unequivocally rid itself of all sense of inferiority. The reverse of this negative self-image often comes 
with a radical upgrading of all positive traits of “the would be nation”. Consequently, an openly 
declared sense of superiority can develop against the out-groups (Conversi, 1997, 61). 
3.2. Nationalist discourse   
 
The emergence of national identity and especially its character has significant consequences for the 
nationalist discourse of the movement. The choice of a special symbol on nationality, such as 
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language or race can have direct political consequences as reflected in the movements’ ideological 
formulations. The choice however, is dependent on pre-existing conditions. Therefore, Conversi 
states that historical and anthropological conditions have the power to influence the patterns of 
political mobilization (Conversi, 1997, 162). 
Shmuel Nili (2009) for example argues that differences in national identity led to different types of 
nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque country. The Basque case is an example of ethnic 
nationalism, while the Catalan case is an example of civic nationalism. He deploys the difference 
made by Rogers Brubaker in his research on German and French nationalism in 1992. Brubaker states 
that the understanding of French nationhood has been assimilationist, while the understanding of 
German nationhood has been differentialist. In France, the gradual formation of a nation-state 
around a single political and cultural center produced the conditions for an assimilationist self-
understanding. In Germany, a conglomerative pattern of state-building, uniting two confessions and 
even two nations (Prussia) in one state, produced conditions for a differentialist self-understanding 
(Brubaker, 1992, 5).  Brubaker uses historical, geographic and cultural path dependency in order to 
explain the differences between the assimilation oriented French nationalism and the exclusionary 
oriented German nationalism (Nili, 2009, 247). 
Civic nationalism is seen as an inclusive form of nationalism because the nation is defined by political 
terms rather than ethnic or biological limits. A member of a different ethnic minority, who accepts 
the tradition, culture and civil religion of the nation, can theoretically be considered an equal citizen. 
This kind of civic national identity can be acquired. In contrast to the ethnic form of nationalism, civic 
nationalism presents a significant possibility for assimilation. Ethnic nationalism defines the limits of 
a national community based on ethnic origins. Therefore, it produces a clear possibility of exclusion 
(Nili, 2009, 247).  
Keating (1997) however emphasizes that ethnic and civic nationalism are ideal types. They do not 
constitute a descriptive taxonomy.  Several nationalist movements actually make both types of 
appeal, and are based on both ethnic and civic elements. An ethnic nationalist movement for 
example may adopt civic elements to legitimate themselves in a society where liberal democratic 
values prevail. Civic nationalist movements could also use ethnically exclusive sentiments to enhance 
their mobilizing power. What matters is the balance between the two and which elements dominate 
the nationalist discourse (Keating, 1997, 691). 
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3.3. Symbolic frameworks   
 
Finlayson (1998) points out that there is a danger in analyzing nationalism based on general or 
unitary theories such as civic or ethnic nationalism. Instead he stresses that there is always an 
irreducible specifity of any nationalist phenomena. Every nationalist movement always contains a 
very specific content, which aims to define concepts such as the culture and values of the nation. This 
content is of essential importance for the deployment and construction of the nationalist discourse 
(Finlayson, 1998, 99). When analyzing nationalism mainly based on unitary and general theories, the 
importance of this specific kind of content is obscured. Therefore Finlayson argues we should analyze 
and theorize nations and nationalism seeking not only for universal theories but try to comprehend 
the ways in which nationalism functions within the a broader political context. 
 
Laura Desfor Edles (1999) tries to analyze Spanish sub-state nationalism within such a broader 
political context based on symbolic structures. She suggested a culturalistic approach to explain 
differences in Spanish sub-state nationalism. Based on its national identity and its nationalist 
discourse, for every nationalist movement we can identify a symbolic structure. She conceptualizes 
culture as a set of symbolic structures that pattern actions just as structures of a more visible kind 
do.  Symbols can thus provide a nonmaterial structure based on which she explains why for example 
one particular statement appeared while the other did not. The idea of the imagined political 
community, as Benedict Anderson pointed out, is that it unites the living and the dead. It joins the 
biographies of individual persons and the nation as a whole in a common historical narrative. A 
cultural historical approach can thus be used to show how shared meanings within this “would be” 
nation develop and change over time, based on different historical circumstances and situations. 
These symbolic structures also shape action at any particular point in history (Edles, 1999, 311-314). 
The memory of a nationalist movement for example can produce a very strong symbolic structure. 
Diego Muro (2009) defines the memory of a nationalist movement as a conglomerate of individual 
experiences that have been deliberately shaped to mark social boundaries and define a sense of 
belonging. The formation of a collective memory is a complex and unpredictable process in which 
memories are sustained by national tradition, myths and symbols which are constantly renewed by 
nationalist elites. New political situations and ideological settings often encourage the national elites 
to recall the past in order to define the nationalist political project. National memories are important 
because they outlive individual participants of history and influence the way new generations look at 
their past (Muro, 2009, 675-676). 
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4. Operationalization 
 
This thesis will adopt a concept of subnationalism which was initially developed by Singh (2008). She 
conceptualizes the strength of sub nationalism in Indian states based on a set of indicators. These are 
language, print capitalism and subnational mobilization. These indicators tap into the concept which 
Singh calls a “we-feeling”. They determine to what extent a subnational movement is able to identify 
its people and the strength and popular support of the movement. This thesis will adopt Singh’s 
framework to establish the relative differences in success of the three movements.  
Language has been central to almost every theoretical understanding and empirical assessments of 
nationalism. Singh operationalizes the language indicator based on internal homogeneity and 
external differentiation. There is scholarly consensus that a single, shared and distinctive language 
promotes subnationalism. Therefore Singh analyzes the language variable as an aggregate based on 
the questions whether the language in the movement under study is the single language, a common 
language and/or a distinctive language (Sing, 2008, 6-8). Based on scholarly literature I will assess to 
what extent Catalan, Basque and Galician languages were single, common and/or distinctive, 
creating the same aggregate variable as Singh uses in which presence of all three elements results in 
a relatively stronger language indicator than the presence of for example only one of the three 
elements. However, the main focus of the language indicator will be on to what extent the languages 
of the three movements were widely spoken, understood and written within Catalan, Basque and 
Galician regions. A widely spoken and written language can be seen as a strong indicator of a 
cohesive and strong subnational identity. 
For the second indicator, print capitalism, Singh analyses the circulation of vernacular newspapers, 
which is viewed as the medium through which a subnational community begins to perceive itself. In a 
range of cases, the role of newspaper spread has been identified as a driving force towards sub 
nationalism. To analyze this indicator Singh looks at the per capita number of newspapers and the 
per capita circulation (Singh, 2008, 8-9). For this thesis I will evaluate to what extent the Basque, 
Catalan and Galician nationalist movements were able to set up an organization for the circulation of 
literature with a nationalist character. Due to the available data, I will deploy a more qualitative 
assessment of to what extent literature, newspapers and cultural expressions have influenced the 
sense of belonging to the sub nation. Furthermore, especially for the analysis of Catalan and Galician 
nationalism, leaving out the influence of these kinds of cultural markers would be inadequate since 
these elements were essential for these communities to emerge. The Renaixença for example (a 
cultural and linguistic revolution), was of essential importance for Catalan nationalism. The analysis 
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of the print capitalism indicator in this thesis is thus much broader and based on a more qualitative 
assessments, while Singh concentrates on quantative measures. I will for example also include to 
what extent the movements were able to influence education policy to promote and sustain the use 
of regional languages. Promoting the use of for example the Catalan language meant an early 
standardization of its written form, which ultimately influences the possibilities for Catalan education 
and the use of Catalan as the official administrative language, which in turn strengthens the 
subnational movement.  
To further establish the strength of a subnational movement, Singh analyzes the support for the idea 
of subnational identity. As Anderson stated, it’s essential that even though the members of the 
community might never meet each other, they have to ‘imagine’ that they are part of a distinct 
community or a single (sub) nation. For the analysis of subnational mobilization Singh looks at three 
different observable manifestations: popular mobilization, support for political parties and the 
absence of a separatist party. Popular mobilization is a clear indicator of both a subnational 
consciousness and a desire for political control in the territorial homeland. Second, she looks at 
electoral support for subnational political parties with a subnational political ideology. When 
successful in the sense that this party gathers a substantial amount of support during elections, this is 
also a clear indicator of subnational sentiment. Subnational parties are thus both a consequence of 
nationalist sentiments and a consolidation and expansion of the nationalist movement (Sing, 2008, 
10-11). Based on literature and election results I will deploy an analysis concentrated on the support 
for nationalist political parties compared to the support for state-wide parties, to investigate to what 
extent the three movements were able to politically mobilize their people and gain electoral support. 
Electoral support for nationalist parties obviously indicates a strong and cohesive subnational 
movement. However, all three movements have known several political parties claiming to represent 
the true nationalist movement. Therefore the assessment of the support for political parties would 
be inadequate without taking into account to what extent political representation was fragmented.  
The existence of a rival subnationalism within a state likely signals a more fragmented subnational 
identity and solidarity. Singh therefore takes the presence of competing subnationalist identification, 
which can be observed through the occurrence of a movement by a section of the populace of the 
region or province, as indicative of a lower level of subnationalism. When a region or province is not 
characterized by such competing subnationalist attachments, Singh argues that the subnational 
identity is stronger en more cohesive (Sing, 2008, 14). The absence of a separatist party thus 
indicates a less fragmented subnational identity and solidarity. Within all three cases there have 
been several parties claiming to represent nationalist sentiments. I will therefore use the idea of 
separatist parties slightly different. I will describe to what extent we can speak of fragmentation 
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among several parties and to what extent they were in conflict about the identity of the subnation 
and their goals. This allows me to asses to what extent the national identity was fragmented or 
cohesive, based on the amount and character of representation through several political parties.  
These 3 indicators described as language, print capitalism and subnational mobilization can be seen 
as cues which signal the cohesion or fragmentation of subnationalism. Sing argues that language and 
newspaper circulation tap into the concept of one-ness and belonging. Subnational mobilization 
reflects the idea of a “we-feeling” which ultimately strengthens or weakens the common identity 
(Singh, 2008, 17). No single indicator is sufficient to establish a strong subnational movement, but 
when the three indicators together are strong, we can speak of a cohesive and strong nationalist 
movement. In terms of relative success, I therefore argue that when a subnational movement is 
characterized as strong in more indicators, the stronger the cohesiveness and success of the 
subnational movements. 
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5. Historical background:  Catalonia, The Basque country and Galicia 
 
5.1. Catalonia 
 
“No one disputes the role of the Renaixença, that is, the recovery of Catalan as a literary language, in 
creating the atmosphere in which Catalan nationalism was to be born” (Balcells, 1996, 25). 
Catalonia became the most powerful mercantile empire of the Mediterranean between the twelfth 
and fourteenth century. In the fifteenth and sixteenth century los Reyes Catolicos, Ferdinand and 
Isabella tried to centralize the country into a Spanish church state (Edles, 316-319, 199). By 1716 the 
new regime had successfully abolished the autonomous constitutional systems of not only Catalonia, 
but also Aragon, Valencia and the Balearics. Catalonia had been the most recalcitrant region. Its 
constitutional system in the late middle ages was one of the most developed in the whole of Europe. 
Catalan commerce, finance, shipping and manufactures were increasingly beneficial, making 
Catalonia the dominant military and economic power in the region (Hargreaves, 2000, 18; Payne, 
1971, 15-16). 
In the eighteenth century Catalonia was fully integrated within the broader Spanish affairs. The 
Catalans proved to be fully conscious of the advantages of the Spanish system and showed complete 
loyalty towards the Spanish crown (Payne, 1971, 15-16). The years 1878-88 where a period of 
prosperity for Catalan industry and commerce. The period is known as the era of Febre d’or (gold 
fever). The expansion of Catalan economy paralleled the rebirth of Catalan literature. This process is 
known as the Renaixença (Payne, 1971, 18). The Renaixença was the start of a cultural revolution 
which resulted in an increased salience of the national Catalan identity, based on a shared history, a 
shared culture, but most importantly, a national language.  
At the end of 19th century, Catalan scholars began to study the socio-economic, literary and political 
history of Catalonia from the middle ages. The aim of their studies was the recovery of Catalonia’s 
self-esteem as a cultural identity. This created the possibility for the Catalan mother tongue to 
become a modern literary language once more, although the process wasn’t easy. Catalan is a 
difficult language, far removed from Castilian Spanish. Basic schooling also was still in Castilian and 
the first literary works of for example Victor Balaguer, about Catalan history where in Castilian 
(Balcells, 1996, 25). 
Aribau`s famous poem, Oda a la patria (Ode to the homeland), unintentionally created and 
formulated the central idea of Catalan nationalism: language.  While for other nationalist movements 
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race or religion where to constitute the main sign of the collective identity, Aribau´s poem identified 
language and the homeland. In 1843, Joaquim Rubio I Ors strengthened the recovery of Catalan 
literature, by proclaiming that Catalonia could still aspire to be autonomous. This would not be a 
form of political independence, but certainly a literary independence (Balcells, 1996, 26). In 1859, the 
Jocs Florals (historically related poetry contests) where restored in Barcelona bringing renascent 
Catalan literature to a wider public. The Jocs Florals were aiming at re-establishing the prestige of the 
Catalan language (Hargreaves, 2000, 24). 
Essential though, where the  undertakings with lesser literary pretentions, such as books from the 
priest Antoni Maria Claret, a repertoire of songs collected by Anselm Clave and numerous comedies 
that where performed in Catalan. Serafi Soler was one of many Catalans who defended Catalan ”as it 
was spoken today”, against the artificial Jocs Florals. Catalan magazines became an established fact 
during the 1870’s, inspiring a wide audience (Balcells, 1996, 26). The Renaixença started as an urban 
phenomenon, but quickly penetrated the more backward and rural hinterland. This was one of the 
main factors for the growing support among the rural populations for Catalanism (Hargreaves, 200, 
24). 
The Renaixença swept all sectors of society with a musical, political and especially literary wave of 
creativity. This cultural revival touched all fields of humanities and spread all over the Catalan 
speaking regions (Conversi, 1997, 15). During the 1880s the Renaixença reached its peak. The 
poetical genius Jacint Verdaguer was one of the influential artists that succeeded in bringing the 
literary and spoken language together. They attained a quality that even enabled them to find 
readers outside Catalonia. While the Catalan language was created, the Catalans realized they lacked 
a genuine Catalan culture. This implied they had to Catalanize education and secure an official 
language status (Balcells, 1996, 26). 
The Catalan movement first began to take organizational form initialized by Almiral, a former 
federalist leader. His first Catalan congress was attended by 1500 people. Two years later he formed 
the Centra Catala, the first concrete entity to pursue the goal of Catalan autonomy. In 1886 Almiral 
published a collection of speeches and articles that presented a doctrine of political Catalanism. Its 
main focus was on the distinct regional culture and society of Catalonia. Almiral stated that its 
psychology and values where different from the rest of Spain. Catalonia thus required a broad 
political administrative autonomy. This program was neither republican nor exclusivist. He saw 
Catalonia as the first modern region in Spain, whose example would help the rest of the country to 
modernize (Payne, 1975, 66-68).  
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The Renaixença was the start of a cultural revolution which resulted in an increased salience of the 
national Catalan identity, based on a shared history, a shared culture, but most importantly, a 
national language. Since Admiral’s connotations where too radical for many Catalans, a group of 
intellectuals broke off to form the Lliga Catalunya in 1887. They merged with a leading Catalan 
cultural group forming the Unio Catalanista. The notion of autonomy for Catalonia was slowly 
growing among the middle classes and some even went further. Round 1899, the term nationalist 
was first used with frequency to explain autonomous Catalan regionalism (Payne, 1975, 70-71). 
In 1894, Enric Prat de la Riba, a young middle class leader, published the Compendi Nacionalista, the 
first complete ideology of Catalanism. Prat defined Spain as a political state, but Catalonia was the 
true fatherland, and therefore constituted a distinct and fully developed nationality. The state 
therefore had to be altered conform this nationality. Catalan nationalism was not separatist, but 
demanded a regional parliament and a fully autonomous administration. Catalanism was to become 
the vehicle for middle-class modernization and economic development, promoting social harmony 
(Payne, 1975, 71). The success of the Renaixença and the rich output produced by Catalan literature 
provided a solid political and societal base on which the nationalist movement draws its stable 
legitimacy upon today. Catalan nationalism relies on a pre-existing identity. This identity had already 
been completed by the cultural revival and preceded political nationalists (Conversi, 1997, 16). 
In 1911 the idea of uniting the four Catalan provinces under one administrative umbrella began to 
take shape. In 1914, the mancomunitat de Catalunya was officially set up, and functioned as an 
administrative government of the four diputaciones of Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida and Girona. The 
mancomunitat soon became active in several fields and many institutions where created or 
expanded.  An institute of Catalan studies was created to improve education (Hargreaves, 2000, 28) 
and roads and local services were improved to foster the regional culture. The actions of the 
mancomunitat soon gave Catalonia the most intense cultural life of any region in Spain. Especially 
the changes in education where extremely effective and innovative (Conversi, 1997, 33). 
Artists and intellectuals found in the mancomunitat and ideal source of support. This led to the 
creation of the Noucentista movement (nine-hundred-ism, referring to the new century). More than 
ever, the project of cultural Catalanism was a unifying platform for a wide range of interests, such as 
ideology, political parties, voluntary organizations, arts and school. The heart of this project was 
centered around language and its orthographic unification (Conversi, 1997, 33). 
However, on September the 13th 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera declared his dictatorship in 
Spain. At the beginning, most Catalans hoped this would bring stability. However, within a few days, 
a royal degree banished the Catalan flag and language and all offences against the unity of the 
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Spanish country were placed under jurisdiction of military courts. Catalan organizations where 
dissolved and meetings where prohibited. Despite the dictatorship, Catalan culture persisted in a 
semi-clandestine environment. Lacking public support, the dictatorship soon slowly burned itself out 
until it came to a sudden end in 1930 (Conversi 1997, 36-37). 
In 1931, the statute of autonomy was approved and the Generalität (Catalan autonomous 
government) was re-established and Macia elected first president. However, in 1936 the Spanish 
garrison in Marocco, under command of General Francisco Franco revolted against the dual treats of 
socialism and separatism. The civil war had begun. In 1939, after the conquest of Barcelona, the 
Generalität was dissolved and Catalan leaders where either executed or escaped into exile. The end 
of the civil war in 1939 started the Francoist era (Conversi, 1997, 41-42). 
Franco adopted the most radical politics of assimilation ever known against non-Castilian cultures in 
modern Spanish history. Catalan was banned as a spoken language in the workplace, and the Franco 
regime took several measures to not simply suffocate Catalan culture but tried to eradicate any sign 
of Catalan identity. Their results were devastating and a defeated silence fell over the entire nation 
(Conversi, 1997, 111-113). Any sign of opposition or independence was brutally suppressed; 
thousands were executed or forced into exile. Hargreaves even goes as far to state that Catalan 
identity and Catalan nationalism where threatened with extinction (Hargreaves, 2000, 28). 
As soon as the repression was slightly eased after the defeat of fascism, Catalanism gave sign of 
renewed vitality.  The strong cultural emphasis of Catalan nationalism created the conditions for a 
peaceful nationalist revival in which most opposition forces were accepted, independently of their 
ideology. This evolution was made possible by the lively pre-existing regional culture, especially in 
terms of language and literature (Conversi, 1997, 125). The second most important factor in 
stimulating the revival of Catalan nationalism where the very successful economic policies of the 
Franco regime in the 1950’s and 60’s. Both Catalonia and the Basque country where in the vanguard 
of Spanish economic modernizations (Hargreaves, 2000, 29). 
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5.2. The Basque country 
 
 “The origins of the Basques remain shrouded in mystery” (Payne, 1971, 32). 
The Basque nationalist movement derives from the Non-European origins of the Basque people. They 
are the sole survivors of the pre-indo European population and their language is the sole surviving 
non Indo-European language, but wasn’t standardized until the 1960’s. Based on their prehistoric 
identity the Basque people are the most ancient ethnic group in Europe, but they were never a single 
people (Edles, 1999, 322-327).  
The three Basque Provinces, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and Alava had been formally incorporated within the 
Spanish kingdom during the fourteenth century.  Only the Basque remained its separate 
constitutional identity of the system of the Fueros. The Fueros refers to an ancient period of local 
(not national) self-rule within several communities. The Basques are the only people in Europe who 
did not suffer from the western feudal system (Edles, 322-323, 1999). The Fueros provided for 
separate legal and financial administration under the regional aristocracy (Payne, 1971, 32). The 
Basque country thus never was a full autonomous national government, while the Catalans had been 
the most develop constitutional political system during the late middle ages (Payne, 1971, 15-16). 
Sabino de Arana y Goiri was the creator of Basque ideology and founder of the movement. Young 
Sabino grew up in an atmosphere of great moral seriousness, being a deeply religious man. His 
brother Luis convinced him of the idea that the  Basques were intrinsically different from Spaniards 
(Kern, 1990, 34-35). The Basque country  was not a part of Spain, but it was an ancient republic that 
had voluntarily associated itself with the Castilian crown, while retaining absolute autonomy and 
institutional and ethnical purity. Spain had usurped Vizcaya while attempting to corrupt its people 
(Payne, 1975, 65-66). 
During the Febre d Or, young Sabino came to Barcelona for his studies. Only a year in Barcelona was 
needed to fully embrace his brother’s thoughts on the Vizcayan theory. During this process, the 
Catalan Renaixença began to reach its climax. In the Barcelona of the 1880’s, Arana began to 
conceive his own doctrine of Basque nationalism.  He began to devote himself entirely to Basque 
studies in 1885, starting with language, because like all middle-class Vizcayan families, he only spoke 
Castilian. Living in Barcelona and spending his summers in Vizcaya, Arana published the first part of 
his Gramatica Elemental del Euzkara Izkaino (Payne, 1975, 68).  
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In 1888 he moved to Bilbao to take up the challenge of developing an ideology and a movement of 
Vizcayanism that would eventually become Basque Nationalism. His first major political statement 
was a little book called Bizkaya por su independencia, published in 1882. In 1893, Arana started to 
form a movement which would work for the independence of Vizcaya, restoring its supposed original 
state of liberty. In the development of this movement, Arana faced seemingly overwhelming 
obstacles and lacked a genuine base of support (Payne, 1975, 69-70). By contrast, during this period, 
the more moderate and collaborationist elements of Catalan nationalist movement began to build 
organizations. 
Arana had to begin his movement almost single handedly. In 1883, he founded his biweekly journal 
called Bizkaitarra (The Vizcayan), and began to pronounce his doctrines and published articles on 
grammar, philology, Basque history, culture and local politics. In 1894, the first political incident 
occurred, when “the Arana brothers” burned a Spanish flag after a Basque musical concert before 
the symbolic foral tree of Guernica. In 1895 this group took formal shape in the organization of 
Bizkai-Buru-Batzar, which was eventually going to be called PNV, the Basque nationalist party (Payne, 
1975, 71-72). 
Since the Basque area had never been a single political unit, Arana had to invent one. He came up 
with the name Euzkadi, an enology that meant the “Basque land”. He also designed a flag: two-
crossed banners on a red background with a white cross (Edles, 1999, 322-324; Payne, 1975-73-74). 
A central element in Arana’s ideology was his believe of Basque purity, both ethnically and culturally. 
As Edles states: Arana believed that efforts needed to be made to preserve and strengthen the 
Basque race, and that political independence was both a right and the objective for the Basque 
people (Edles, 324, 1999). 
Arana completely rejected the readiness to compromise like the Catalan nationalists of his time.  He 
made an absolute distinction of what was Basque, and what was Spanish. Basques and Spaniards 
where members of different races. The Basque race was pure while Spanish was not (MacClancy, 
2007, 105). He condemned the Vizcayans that had married ordinary Spaniards,  because they had 
“confounded themselves with the most vile and despicable race in Europe”.  He also said the Basque 
didn’t have to become separatist, for the Basque Provinces had never really joined Spain. It was 
impossible to separate that which had never been united. The Basques only needed to reassert their 
fundamental independence. He strongly condemned the Catalan error which was to define the 
Basques and Catalans as brothers, the Basque brother being in misfortune (Payne, 1975, 75).  
The Catalans where a part of Spain, whereas the Basque country had nothing to do with Spain. 
Catalan politics consisted of attracting to other Spaniards as well, whereas the Vizcayan program was 
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to reject all Spaniards as foreigners.  Arana didn’t want people who weren’t originally Basque to learn 
Euskara, while this was an explicit goal of Catalan nationalism (Payne, 1975, 75). This contradicted 
Arana’s idea of the purity of race, in which language was one of the basic elements (MacClancy, 
2007, 106). Inclusion through the teachings of Catalan language thus was an important element  in 
the Catalan attitude towards migrants, while in the Basque country, language was used for the 
opposite. As Nili states,  It merely functioned for exclusionary purposes (Nili, 2009, 252). “Arana’s 
chief cultural goal was not to spread Euskara, but to prevent foreigners from knowing it” (Nili, 2009, 
253).  
Arana created Basque nationalism and the concept of the Basque Nation by creating nationalist 
symbols (anthem and flag).  Arana is seen as the undisputed founder and ideologue of the Basque 
nationalist movement. His goal was to preserve and strengthen the Basque race independence 
(Edles, 1999, 322-324). In contrast to Catalan nationalism, which emerged in the context of a pre-
existing cultural and linguistic revival, Basque nationalism emerged almost singlehandedly through 
the efforts of Arana, who created the very concept of the Basque nation (Edles, 1999, 324). 
A first limited success for the nationalists came in 1898 when Arana himself was elected for the 
provincial assembly of Vizcaya. In the 1899 municipal elections, the nationalists won five seats on the 
city council of Bilbao and three nearby towns. After a second imprisonment in 1902 Arana’s health 
became precarious due to Addison’s disease. He had to resign as president of the PNV and died on 25 
November 1903, aged thirty-eight. He was long remembered under Basques as someone of courage 
and self-sacrifice. He was considered a model to his followers (Conversi, 1997, 68-69). After Arana’s 
dead, little progress was made for almost twenty years. The political elite of the region had a good 
relationship with the Spanish political parties and a large group of devoted Catholics supported 
variants of carlism and integrism while the growing proletariat was attracted to the Spanish socialist 
party. The Basques elite had adapted to the concentration of capital in Madrid and thought much 
more in terms of broader Spanish economic development. They showed a great willingness to co-
operate with the Spanish elite and accepted aristocratic titles from the crown (Payne, 1971, 37-38). 
The first major triumph for the nationalists came in 1917. In the province of Vizcaya they gained an 
absolute majority in seats in the diputacion. However, the post-war depression and economic crisis 
led to the national question being relegated to the background. The situation was reflected in an 
electoral decline of the nationalist party. The crisis fed internal dissent leading to a split of  
readjustment of the party. The re-emerging party was now called Partido nacionalista Vasco (PNV) 
and became a major force in Basque politics (Conversi, 1997, 69-70). However, Arana left a legacy of 
contradictions and ambivalences that showed the seeds of future nationalist fragmentation. Each of 
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the opposing forces within the nationalist field claimed to be the true inheritor of his ideal, whether 
in its moderate or radical form, anti-capitalist or industrialist focus.  
Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship forced the two major Parties, PNV and CNV into clandestine activity. 
As with most dictatorships, the stronger the repression the more nationalistic feelings were boosted. 
Both Catalans and Basques emerged with renewed vigor, reinforced by years of secrecy. The 
conditions of clandestinely emphasized the importance of culture since informal cultural and folkloric 
groupings where the only outlet available to express nationalistic sentiments (Conversi, 1997, 73-74). 
The nationalists agreed to unite their two wings (CNV and PNV) under one PNV banner. The 
dictatorship had thus helped to boost Basque nationalism, uniting the different souls and even 
mobilize wider sectors. This led to an assembly in Vergara (1930) where a new generation of political 
leaders emerged (Payne, 1971, 43). They were united under pure Aranist principles, only the idea of 
separatism was toned down. Race and religion where firmly confirmed as the bastions of Basque 
identity (Conversi, 1997, 73-75). 
In 1933 the PNV became the largest party in the region, claiming 12 of the 24 seats in Cortes. This 
was the greatest electoral victory in the PNV’s history (Payne, 1975, 134). In December 1935, the 
Basque country received a status of autonomy from the republic. This was the fourth version of the 
proposed status of autonomy. The first three had failed due to anti-republican opposition from Alava 
and Navarra. However, the autonomous government, which was installed very quickly and made the 
Basque country a very orderly and the least revolutionary part of Spain, lasted only nine months 
(Conversi, 1997, 75-76). During the civil war, the Basques had supplied the republicans with some of 
their most effective troops. In 1937, German planes bombed the Gonder legion and the town of 
Guernica on a market day slaughtering hundreds of people (Edles, 1999, 325-326). This was the first 
aerial bombardment of a civilian population. Autonomy only lasted 9 months and ended when Bilbao 
was captured by the Spanish nationalist troops in June 1937. The statute was abrogated and all 
political parties where suppressed (Conversi, 1997, 75-77). 
From 1939 to 1945 the Basque country was subjected to a regime of state terror with no parallel in 
its history. Franco’s troops launched a campaign of repression against any sign of Basque identity. 
Even innocents expressions as music and dance were subjected to suspicion (MacClancy, 2007, 16). 
Numerous people were imprisoned or executed under the pretext of promoting separatism 
(Conversi, 1997, 80-82).  The political persecutions  of the Basque language and culture by the Franco 
regime created  the foundations for several unintended consequences. The memories of repression 
lead to a new post-war generation who was extremely radicalized in its Basque nationalist 
consciousness (Perez-Agote, 2006, 73). 
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5.3. Galicia 
 
Galician culture is always on the edge, complaining about everything, and of course it does not make 
any long-term plans, as it expects to die soon (Barreto, 2011, 385). 
In 14th and 15 century, Galician language had almost started to fulfill every role and aspect of a 
national language. Until the unification of Castile and Aragon, Galicia had enjoyed a  degree of 
political autonomy. However, due to centralization and the socio-political situation of Spanish affairs, 
Galician language devaluated. By the end of the 15the century, Galicia was  totally incorporated 
within the crown of Castile, which blocked every attempt at establishing Galician as a national 
language. Galician completely lost its status as the official language for public administration. The 
state language, Castilian became dominant (Beswick, 2007, 58-60).  
The Galician nobility came to see the issue of Galician ethnicity as a negative social threat. Galician 
suffered from social disdain and the Castilian language became a necessity for social progress. The 
new ruling elite of Galicia were predominantly Castilian speaking and the Galician nobility learnt 
Castilian out of necessity for any kind of social progress (Keating, 2001, 226).  Galician clergy, who 
remained to play an important role in society, where replaced by Castilian speaking priests and 
abbots, which resulted in the fact that the people could no longer communicate with them. The use 
of Castilian was thus effectively enforced upon the Galician people. However, the rural areas were 
still geographically and socially isolated. Galician remained the dominant language which supported 
the divide among elite/rural lines which in turn  enforced the necessity of speaking Castilian for social 
progress (Beswick, 2007, 61). 
In 1700, the installation of the royal house of Borbon in Spain brought important changes. The 
monarchy strived to create a unified and homogenies Spain. The Ley Moyano of 1857 forbade the 
use of any language other than Castilian. Within Spanish education, Castilian language became 
exclusive and compulsory.  For the next two hundred years, the hegemony of Spanish society by the 
imposition of the use of Castilian was to continue virtually unabated. Galicians came to see their 
language as poor and lacking in prestige (Beswick, 2007, 61-61). The rest of Spain regarded Galicia as 
a poor and  backward region and the Galician economy became extremely dependent from the 
central government (Keating, 2001, 226) 
Despite the negative reputation of Galicia, the 18th century was characterized by a degree of 
economic developments and social and political upheaval. Castilian, officially seen as the dominant 
and only language, was used especially in the urban region, but in the countryside Galician was still 
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used by clergy’s and landowners. In many regions around the world, language had become an 
important way in which communities could articulate its political aspiration. This led to a period 
characterized as Galleguismo. A small group, predominantly from the upper class of Galician urban 
society, attempted to demonstrate their strong ethnic ties and identification with the region, its 
history, culture and language. Rosalia de Castro published a book of poetry, Os canteres de gallegos, 
in 1863, which was the first modern work written entirely in Galician and marked the beginning of a 
literary renaissance. Just as the Renaixença marked the beginnings of the idea of Catalanism, the 
Rexurdimento (Resurrection) marked the beginning of Galician nationalism (Beswick, 2007, 64-65). 
The Rexurdimento aimed at the recuperation of medieval traditions and attempted to lend credence 
to the use of Galician among the cultural elite. It tried to induce a sense of historical conscience and 
highlight the use of Galician. For the first time a collective voice appeared which was preoccupied 
with the establishment of a cultural and unified variety of the language (Baker, 2000, 164-165). 
Initially, the Rexurdimento was a literary and cultural movement, but subsequently, the reawakening 
of political consciousness and the attempt to have Galician officially recognized as a regional 
language led to the movements of Galleguista which also tried to identify the regions distinct 
identity. It demonstrated the idiosyncratic traits of the region setting it apart from the rest of Spain. 
The Galleguista movement was thus the predecessor of the rise of regionalism as a political doctrine 
(Beswick, 2007, 65). 
As a regionalist movements, Galleguismo was to achieve total autonomy from Spain’s governing 
bodies in Madrid. The movements organized its own political party: Asociacion Regionalista Gallega, 
based on Murguia’s ideology. Galicia was to modernize socially and politically in order to retain its 
ethnic identity and roots to survive (Beswick, 2007, 64-65). However, the movement faced 
opposition from within and outside of Galicia. Some found the resurrection of Galician language 
dangerous because this would mean that Galicians could no longer communicate with the rest of 
Spain, endangering its economic development and the political unity of Spain.  Galleguismo was 
primarily an urban-based movement and didn’t represent the population as a whole. It did bring the 
debate on language to become salient, but Galician society wasn’t ready to accept the consequences 
(Beswick, 2007, 65). 
During this period, in the countryside Galician language was still dominant. However, due to poor 
communication, the rural communities still felt a sense of inferiority and where generally isolated 
from the aims and objectives of the Galleguista movement.  This situation became even worse when 
due to economic crisis, the rural population left the countryside to look for employment in the cities 
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where the use of Castilian was still of essential importance for any social progress. Many people also 
migrated from Galicia to other parts of the world (Beswick, 2007, 66). 
The 19th and 20th century where again characterized by centralizing and unifying policies by the 
Spanish central government. Although the linguistic unification of Galicia was perceived as being of 
vital importance for the Galician identity, many Galleguistas still used Castilian in daily practice which 
meant the movement lost credibility. The revival of Galician language was affected badly by the 
centralized education system. Very few people knew how to read and write Galician, particularly in 
the rural areas. Galician had no standardized orthography and the only written form of Galician had 
been the form of the elites in the cities. Due to the economic situation, Galicia started to abandon 
some of its tradition and started to modernize. Within a few decades, this led to a predominantly 
urban culture and a growing middle class (Beswick, 2007, 67). 
The birth of Galician nationalism is characterized by the year in which the organization called  
irmandades de Fala held its first assembly in Lugo. From this congress emerged the IF Manifesto, 
which adopted the term nationalist instead of regionalist, marking a distinction with the regionalist 
doctrine of the Rexurdimento. It proposed that both Galician and Castilian would be the official 
languages and thus resolved any contradictions between ideological discourse and linguistic practice. 
Their focus was the Galician language itself and to dignify the use of Galician (Beswick, 2007, 68). 
A group of intellectuals, Xeracion Nos, identified Galician as it was spoken in the rural areas as the 
true authentic language. Modern Galician literature began with the Nos group and they advocated 
the establishment of a written standard (Baker, 2000, 165). In the 19th century, several efforts were 
made to publish Galician-Castilian dictionaries and Galician grammar books . The methods of 
Xeracion Nos and Irmandades de Fala differed substantially however. Irmandades de Fala tried to 
achieve nationalist aims by the recuperation of language in the Spanish system. Xeracion Nos wanted 
to undermine such a system by stimulating a sense of national consciousness  in Galicia, defending its 
rights of the people to use Galician as a means of expressing their ethnicity (Beswick, 2007, 68). 
During the second Spanish republic, the loose federalism and decentralization allowed regional 
nationalism to become politically organized. The IF nationalist offered a political alternative in 
contrast to the earlier Galleguista movement, in the form of the Partido Galleguista, which sought 
legal recognition of the Galician language. They also succeeded in installing a sense of national 
consciousness in a minority of the population. In 1936, the Estato autonomia was ratified, 
establishing a co-officiallity of both Galician and Castilian (Beswick, 2007, 69). During the 1930’s, the 
Partido Galleguista was about to become a mass-movement, representing nationalist feelings in 
Galicia. In 1936 it obtained 3 deputies for the Madrid parliament, counted more than 45000 
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members with an increasingly inter-class membership. The leadership as well represented a big part 
of the Galician intelligentsia (Núñez, 2007, 31).  
However, Franco rose to power in 1936, putting an end to progress. Franco’s dictatorship was 
nationalistic and extremely authoritarian. It was completely intolerant towards any aspiration of 
regional autonomy. This repression prevented any further development of the written form of 
Galician. Once again, both the people and the language suffered a further loss of dignity. The regime 
paralyzed the Galleguista movement by controlling all mass media and the education system. 
Leading academics and supporters where jailed or even executed (Beswick, 2007, 69). The  social 
basis of Galician nationalism was expanding, but did not have enough time to become fully 
articulated. Galician national consciousness was not as deeply rooted as it was in Basque Country or 
Catalonia. Its survival under the dictatorship therefore became far more difficult (Núñez, 2007, 31). 
In the Galician case, the civil war interrupted a process of social expansion of the nationalist 
movement, which proved to be unable to withstand the long years of dictatorship. The number of 
Galician nationalists remained very limited and they started to focus on cultural resistance (Nunez 
Seixas, 2000, 316). The Franco regime however  also brought changes. General Franco, who had been 
born in Galicia, increased national investments in his native region and introduced better crops and 
better facilities for the agrarian economy of Galicia (Kern, 1990, 234). Also, the private use of the 
Galician language was ignored, since Franco was not as strict in trying to eradicate the Catalan and 
Basque language, with the Galician language in his own homeland (Beswick, 2007, 69). 
During 27 years (1936-63) Galician nationalism survived as a cultural legacy shared by a minority.  
Since 1950 this minority concentrated on promoting the preservation of the Galician culture. The 
1950’s and 60’s marked another turning point in the recuperation of Galician language. A small 
degree of permissiveness was displayed towards regional languages by the Franco regime. The 
publishing house Editorial Galaxia was founded by Ramon Pineiro and Otero Pedrayo and was 
devoted to publish in the Galician language (Núñez, 2007, 32). Narrative works followed such as 
Merlin a familia, and the focus of the Galleguista movement became  both based on language and 
culture. In the 1960´s cultural institutions were set up to serve as the focus of ideological resistance 
towards Franco, as were two more Galician political parties (Marxist and socialist). Civil protest 
poetry became prevalent by Celso Emilio Ferreiro and by the 1970’s the demand for language rights 
had become established within cultural circles. Singers and poets proclaimed their allegiance to La 
lingua maternal (the mother tongue). A good example is the poem by Manuel Maria called Terra Cha 
(your land). Although there was a renewed interest in the language, the teachings of Galician were 
still forbidden (Beswick, 2007, 70-71).  
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6. Differences in strength and cohesiveness 
The following sections describe the differences in strength and cohesiveness of the three nationalist 
movements. These differences can be found within the several indicators which we have 
operationalized as Language, Print capitalism and Subnational mobilization.   
6.1. Language 
 
Language can be a very powerful incentive for subnational communities to feel connected because it 
connects the present with the past through oral tradition, literature and music. We have 
operationalized the language indicator by evaluating whether language is single, common and or 
distinctive. First of all we can conclude neither of the regional languages were really single, because 
Castilian was spoken in all three regions next to the subnational language. All three languages can to 
some extent be seen as distinctive since they all had their own orthography. This weakens the 
differences between the three movements based on the language indicator because all three 
movements are strong in two of the three language indicators. There are substantial differences 
however in to what extent the regional languages were common and to what extent the supposed 
orthography was actually widely spread.  
The Catalan language can be analyzed as the strongest language of the three movements. This was 
mainly due to the effects of the cultural and literary revolution described in earlier sections as the 
Renaixença. Catalan is a hard language, but due to many undertakings of less literary pretentions, 
Catalan quickly became available to a wide public. The Renaixença swept all sectors of society with a 
musical, literal wave of creativity. The language quickly spread over all Catalan regions.  During the 
1880’s the Catalan language even reached regions outside Catalonia. The undertakings of the 
Mancomunitat around 1914 were also extremely effective in education, giving Catalonia the most 
intense cultural live in any Spanish region. For the Catalans, the recuperation of their language has 
always been the driving force towards nationalist feelings. After every crisis, for example the 
dictatorships of Primo de Rivera and Franco, language was the first instrument to reestablish 
Catalanism.  
The strong sense of Catalan identity is still primarily based on the use of its language. The Catalan 
Generalitat reported that around the year 2000 almost 94% of the population understands Catalan 
and Catalan is spoken by 68%. The proficiency of Catalan language is much lower among immigrants, 
but the strong social incentives encourage immigrants to learn Catalan. Language therefore becomes 
a vehicle for assimilation and still is a symbol of higher social status. There has been a lot of regional 
policy from the regional government to encourage and subsidize  the use of Catalan in education, art, 
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around media and publishing. Levels of competence have increased sharply, thus in some respects, 
these cultural policies have been successful (Keating, 2001, 222). 
The Basque language is said to be the sole surviving non-indo European language. However, it wasn’t 
standardized up until 1960. The founder of Basque nationalism,  Arana, started to devote himself to 
the language and published his first Grammar book around 1885. Language never became one of the 
bastions of identity for the Basque nation. From the beginning, race and religion where firmly 
confirmed as the most important elements of the Basque identity. The Basques claimed that 
language was a part of their uniqueness, but in practice, language was a stumbling block to the 
nationalist movement. Save sectors among the peasantry, Castilian was the main language, and the 
attempted linguistic nationalization movement was received with great hostility from important 
elements in society (Payne, 1971, 38).   
In practice, the Basque language had a very weak position both in society and at an institutional 
level. Partly due to the limited number of written text, a lot of dialects have emerged. In the last 
decades, the academy of Basque language played a crucial role in standardizing the Basque language 
both in oral and written form. Nowadays, a unified Basque language is widely accepted and most 
books are written in Euskara Batua (standardized Basque language), but still only around 25% of the 
population in the Basque Autonomous community is bilingual (both speaking Castilian and Euskara) , 
and only 16% is passively bilingual (Cenoz, 2005, 42-43). 
During the 14th and 15th century, Galician had already started to fulfill every role and aspect of a 
national language. The Galician language however, was prevented from a comparable development 
as the Catalan language due to extreme suppression and a rural/urban divide. After the unification of 
Spain, during the regime of General Rivera and during the Franco Regime, Castilian was enforced 
upon the Galicians just as it was enforced on the Catalans and Basques. This enforcement was 
however more effective in Galicia due to the fact that Galician nobility saw Castilian as a necessity for 
social progress. The upper class in the urban areas thus embraced Castilian, while in the rural areas, 
Galician was still the spoken language in the strongly agrarian focused Galician society. The birth and 
focus of Galician nationalism had always been to dignify the use of Galician and establish co-
officallity in which both Galician and Castilian would be the official languages (Beswick 2007, 60-61; 
Keating, 2001, 227). 
Galicianism has a strong ethno-cultural base. Nowadays, the Galician distinctive language is spoken 
by 90% and understood by 95% of the population, and there are a lot of customs, traditions and 
family structures (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 65). Gallego is thus actually the only minority language in 
Spain, spoken by almost the entire regional population. However, this is not a sign of a healthy 
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language, but merely the reflection of a lack of migration. Galician is used much more in the country 
side than in the cities, more among the lower class than among the upper classes and more in 
familiar than in formal settings. Its use in written communication is still very small. Unlike Catalan, it 
is still associated with social disdain and those who aspire upward mobility still avoid the use of 
Galician and turn to Castilian. As Keating  states,  unlike the Catalan language, Gallego  cannot readily 
be used  to construct an imagined community, seen as dynamic, integrated, modern and European 
(Keating, 2001, 227). 
Galician and Catalan are functional roman languages, easily adapted to contemporary culture and 
technical requirements, Euskara on the other hand is extremely hard, both to learn and in its capacity 
to be adapted to new requirements. Non Catalan speaking migrants frequently achieve some degree 
of familiarity with Catalan and tend to be culturally and psychologically Catalanized. This process was 
encouraged by the assimilationist attitudes of Catalan policies, whereas the Basque loyalties have 
always been more exclusive and particularistic. Moreover, immigrants into the Basque country come 
predominantly from northern Spanish regions and possessed a stronger Castilian culture. In 
Catalonia, the use of Catalan tended to be associated with upward mobility, and knowledge of the 
regional culture and language tends to increase according to income and social status. This situation 
is almost completely reversed in The Basque Country, where knowledge of Euskara is highest among 
sectors of the lower and middle classes and lowest among the wealthiest and best educated (Payne, 
1975, 237-238).  
The Catalans thus clearly score the strongest on the language indicator, followed by the Galicians. For 
the Basques, language was always one of biggest problems that the nationalist movement had to 
deal with. Nowadays, the bilingual educational system in the Basque country has consolidated 
Basque education, leading to an increasing number of students who have Basque as the language of 
instruction. This has had a significant impact on the number of bilingual speakers (Cenoz, 2005, 53). 
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6.2. Print capitalism 
 
In a range of cases, the spread of newspapers and other forms of literature has been identified as a 
strong driving force towards nationalism. Again the Catalans appear to be the strongest on this 
indicator. The Renaixença produced an enormous amount of literature, ranging from subjects such as 
history and collected songs, or the elitist poetry contests called the Jocs Florals. Catalan magazines 
became an established fact during the 1870. The Catalans were the first to establish universally 
accepted standards for the Catalan language. The main objective of Catalan nationalism was initially 
created by a famous poem from Aribau. His poem identified the homeland and the language. Catalan 
nationalism started with reaching a certain amount of literary and cultural independence before the 
idea of political independence even took shape.  
Education has always been central to Catalan nationalism. In 1898 the first Catalan school was 
created (Sant Jordi). The association for the protection of Catalan education promoted publication of 
books for Catalan schools, which aimed at teaching history and geography of Catalonia. In 1920 there 
were already 120 Catalan schools, which had an important role in the socialization of students with 
the values of the Catalan nation. The teachers were trained at the school of pedagogy (Escola de 
mestres). Schools became a crucial site of the creation of national identity during this period (Laia 
Balcells, 2013, 477). 
During the second republic the Catalan schooling system was enhanced due to ideals of mass literacy 
and fair education. The schools were of essential importance in the peak of mass literacy. They made 
an important contribution to the socialization of a new generation of literate citizens with values 
either against the central Spanish government, or love for the Catalan nation. All this happened 
during the time in which the national movement was gradually growing and influenced the peak and 
endurance of Catalan nationalism (Laia Balcells, 2013, 478). The Catalans thus recognized the 
mobilizing power of education and literature, and adopted policies to strengthen this development. 
Nowadays, almost all elementary and most secondary and tertiary education is in Catalan. This is 
based on the idea that all Catalan children should be bilingual, speaking and writing both Catalan and 
Castilian and preferably also English (Keating, 2001, 222). 
For the Basques, most literary undertaking mainly had political goals. Again, Arana was the first to 
actually start writing about Basque nationalism. His books almost always contained political and 
religious statements. In the bi-weekly journal called Biskaiterra, he mainly described grammar, 
philology, Basque history local politics and religion. The Basque literary production thus had a 
completely different focus than Catalan literary production (Perez-Agote, 2006, 104-105). While the 
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Catalans wrote poems and songs about the homeland, the language and its culture, Basque literary 
production where mainly a means to an end and didn’t have the same mobilizing effect as Catalan 
literature.  
Basque literature was as Stanley Payne states “a frail Growth, represented mainly by a certain 
amount of poetry and essays. It altogether lacked the abundance, variety and distinction of Catalan 
literature. The primitive vocabulary and difficult structure of the language would not have permitted 
more. Two leading writers of the 20th century for example, Miguel de Unamuno and Pio Baroja, were 
both bilingual Basques, but they chose to write in Castilian, opposing the Basque nationalist 
sentiment (Payne, 1971, 39).  
Basque education never fully developed until the university of Bilbao was created in 1968. Before 
this, students only had access to a school of industrial engineering. During the Franco era, the 
absence of a faculty of humanities prevented the preparation of primary and secondary school 
teachers. Only after the death of Franco a university system was established in the Basque Country 
(Perez-Agote, 2006, 63). In 1979 less than 5 percent of all teachers within Basque educational system 
where able to teach through the use of the Basque language. Nowadays over 80% of the teachers 
use the Basque language. The last thirty years  thus had important implications for the educational 
system (Gorter & Cenoz, 2011, 658). 
Already in the 16th and 17th century there were private newspapers in Galician, which even 
continued to be used during the dark ages. Galician had been the official administrative language 
during the 14th and 15th century. Galician nationalism thus had a historically strong existence of 
literature and the use of Galician writing. Just as the Renaixença, the Rexurdimento was preoccupied 
with the establishment of a cultural and unified language. The use of Galician was however evaluated 
as a negative social threat. Also within the indicator of print capitalism, the strength of Galician 
literary undertakings where suppressed by the fact that Galician language was seen as poor and 
lacking in prestige by the urban elites who saw Castilian as a necessity for development. Also, in the 
agrarian regions the Galician people simply couldn’t read or write, which led to a relatively small 
reach of Galician literature. Even nowadays, the use of Galician in all written communication is still 
very small and compared to the Basques and Catalans, the regional government is less active in the 
field of Galician education (Keating, 2001, 227). 
In 1950 the printing house Galaxia was founded, presenting another turning point in Galicianism. 
Editorial Galaxia produced a lot of narrative works and was the start of another resurrection of 
Galician nationalism. However, although there was a renewed interest in the Galician language and 
its literary productions, schooling still wasn’t organized effectively since it was forbidden. Only after 
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the transition towards democracy were the Galicians able to establish Galician as an official language 
(Beswick, 2007, 70-72).  
Modern Galician literature began with the creation of the Xeracion Nos group. Before, Galician 
literature was more localist than nationalist and was more a miniscule group of poets who doubled 
both writers and readers (Baker, 2000, 165). Galician nationalism barely experienced the same 
modernizing influences that shaped Catalan nationalism. Its focus remained on rexurdimento, the 
recuperation of romantic localism with strong Celtic overtones (Baker, 2000, 164). 
The Catalans also score the highest on the Print capitalism indicator, due to the enormous amount of 
literature produced during the Renaixença and the effective education policies which already started 
around 1900. For the Basque however, Print capitalism was one the major problems, just as 
language. There were only a few writers who used the Basque language and Basque education and 
standardization of the written language started around the 1960’s with the creation of the university 
of Bilbao and the instruction of teachers who used the Basque language. Galician literary productions 
faced the problems of the divisions between the educated urban population compared to the 
agrarian rural population, and the social disdain associated with Galician language and writing. Even 
nowadays the use of written Galician is very small and schooling wasn’t organized effectively until 
the transition towards democracy. 
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6.3. Subnational mobilization 
 
The following sections describe the developments of the three nationalist movements after the 
transition towards democracy in 1978 and analyze to what extent the three nationalist movements 
have been able to mobilize political support for the nationalist parties. 
6.3.1. Catalonia 
 
After the Franco Regime Catalanism re-emerged in purely cultural manifestations and took a political 
form once prohibition was relaxed . Step by step, just as during the regime of Primo de Rivera, and 
before that, the Renaixença, Catalanism reflected a pattern of gradual evolution of the stateless 
nation building (Conversi, 1997, 140). Catalan political mobilization has always based upon the 
efforts of intellectuals and artists. Catalans have found their identity by habitually falling back on 
institutions of civil society. Catalan popular cultural manifestations such as the national dance, the 
Sardana, functioned as forms of political affirmation at times when Catalan nationalism was 
struggling against repression (Hargreaves, 2000, 21).  
Within Catalanism, cultural nationalism provided a shared horizon for a movement which was 
politically fragmented. Political pluralism always persisted  within the Catalan nationalist movement 
and even increased under the hegemony of the Lliga Catalunya. The lliga could only exert a limited 
amount of influence over a number of short-lived republican parties, which finally united under 
Macia’s populist leadership leading towards the ratification of the statute of autonomy  in 1931. 
However, the splits where purely political. They aimed to disassociate themselves from the bourgeois 
character of the lliga and approach the working class. The fragmentation was thus purely political 
and did not reflect opposing visions of Catalan identity. The aim was to fill up the gap between upper 
and lower classes and between natives and immigrants. It never reflected debates on ambiguity or 
confusion over Catalan identity nor did it result in tensions between radical separatists and moderate 
regionalists (Conversi, 1997, 43). The presence of several political parties claiming to represent the 
Catalan nationalist movements thus didn’t endanger Catalan identity.  
In November 1975, Francisco Franco died. Two days later, Juan Carlos Borbon was named king of 
Spain. What immediately followed was a process of democratization which is nowadays commonly 
characterized as the transition towards democracy. In 1978, the creation of a new Spanish 
constitution meant the first real possibility in decades for submerged nationalist feelings to find their 
voice freely (Conversi, 1997, 141-142). Catalan nationalist reasserted itself leading to the restoration 
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of the statute of autonomy in in 1982. Since the first elections, the main nationalist parties have been 
in control of the Catalan government (Hargreaves, 2000, 30) 
After the introduction of Spanish democracy, the nationalist message spread and became more 
diversified, while maintaining a broad consensus around a few central themes (Conversi, 1997, 158). 
Catalan politics started out as a multi-party system. The first national elections showed a huge victory 
for the left (table A1, appendix). The regional socialists and the communists respectively became the 
first and second party in the Catalan Generalität (Conversi, 1997, 143). The first Catalan elections in 
1980 brought about a change between the political forces in Catalonia. The Convergencia I Unio (CiU) 
became the leading minority party with 27,7 percent of the votes followed by PSC-PSOE and PSUC. 
After the 1980 and 1982 elections, the CIU and PSC tend to be the two pre-dominant political forces 
in both national and Catalan elections (Balcells, 1996, 177-182).  
The CiU, commanding the majority of nationalist support, does not demand complete separation 
from the Spanish state.  The CiU adopts more moderate and pragmatic strategies to obtain maximal 
autonomy within the system. However, the other main nationalist force, The ERC (Esquerra 
Republicana) can be characterized as separatist, but also as non-violent. The Catalan socialist party, 
affiliated to the Spanish national socialist party, provides the main competition for these two 
nationalist parties, but due to its autonomy from the national socialist party, its general orientation is 
still Catalan. In comparison to the two dominant parties, the Catalan conservative Partido Popular 
(PP) and the two communist parties (IC and IU) are rather weakly represented in parliament and 
receive significantly less political support (Hargreaves, 2000, 33).  
The structure of Catalan politics nowadays is still strongly plural. Catalans political culture and 
strategy of pactism enables it to respond very flexible and creatively in its relations with the national 
government. The availability of this wide variety of political parties and competing alternatives, 
combined with the tradition of pactism and explains the absence of violence in Catalan nationalism 
(Hargreaves, 2000, 34). Tensions between radical separatists and moderate regionalists were less 
than in the Basque country. 
Table A1 shows the election results of Catalan elections for regional and the general parliament. 
Looking at these results, Perez-Nievas and Bonet found high volatility between different types of 
elections. Since 1980, the PSOE, a branch of the national socialist party, tends to win a majority in 
general national elections, while the CiU has won a majority in most regional elections. This picture is 
significantly different from the Basque elections, where the PNV wins almost every election, whether 
regional or general (Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008, 64-66). This implies that Catalan voters approach 
every election differently based on whether they are voting for the regional or general parliament. 
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Graph 1 shows the same picture. Depending on the type of elections, especially between 1982 and 
1995, the nationalist parties tend to receive more support at regional elections, and the state-wide 
parties win the general elections. The last decade however, CiU is winning more support than the 
PSOE also during general elections. However, graph 1 shows that the accumulation of the support for 
the two dominant nationalist parties (CiU and ERC), has been somewhat lower than the total support 
for the several state-wide parties.  
 
Graph 1: Catalan election results, total support for nationalist and state-wide parties in percentages 
of the total votes during regional and general elections. 
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6.3.2. The Basque country 
   
During the 1950’s and the Franco Regime, the PNV which had played a major role during the 
republic, now seemed incapable of responding to the new challenges and became increasingly de-
legitimized.  This disenchantment with the PNV was an immediate cause for a breakthrough event in 
modern Basque History, the foundation of ETA (Euzkadi ‘ta askatasuna, Basque land and Freedom). 
With the birth of ETA, the PNV ceased to be the only representative of Basque nationalism and 
opened up a whole new chapter of Basque history (Conversi, 1997,  108). The origins of ETA lie in a 
small group of nationalist students from Bilbao. These students founded a nationalist journal called 
Ekin. Originally , the journal was to some extent associated to EGI, the PNV’s clandestine youth 
organization. The members of Ekin however did not share the moderate approach of the EGI 
organization. Ekin came to dominate the organization of EGI and officially reorganized EGI into ETA 
between 1959 and 1960 (Payne, 1975, 242). 
ETA choose the path of armed struggle and wanted to reach political independence for the Basque 
country by creating a spiral of violence.  The first acts of political violence occurred in 1961, when a 
few explosions shattered government buildings in different cities, but responsibility was not claimed. 
The spiral of violence slowly escalated with the first armed bank robberies in 1968  (Conversi, 1997,  
89-98). The trigger for this cycle of armed struggle had been the violent and often indiscriminate 
oppression under the dictatorship (Conversi, 1997,  108). 
In 1976 ex-ETA and local communists formed the electoral alliance called Euskadiko Ezkerra (the 
Basque left). When it was formed, EE adopted a Marxist and Pro-independence line, but eventually 
moved to an overall acceptance of the regional autonomy framework.  In April 1978, Herri Batasuna 
(HB- Popular Unity) was formed. HB was a coalition which united all groups that rejected the Spanish 
constitution and the Basque autonomy status and declared its aspiration for independence (Conversi, 
1997, 148-152). Herri Batasuna remained to take the extremist position in Basque politics, partly to 
show how the dominant nationalist forces in Basque politics adopted moderation and where 
prepared to compromise. Herri Batasuna persisted in defining the radical edges of Basque 
nationalism (MacClancy, 2007, 40). 
In 1986 jet another party was formed. Eusko Alkartasuna (EA-Basque solidarity), arose as a splinter 
group from the PNV and during the following elections in November 86 won the same amount of 
seats in Basque parliament as the PNV (14 seats) (Conversi, 1997, 148-152). After democracy was 
installed in Spain and in the Basque country, the spread of nationalism was thus characterized by 
increasing fragmentation, not only among several parties, but also within (Conversi, 1997, 158). 
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In the Basque Country, the first general elections during the transition towards democracy saw the 
PNV establish itself as the main Basque Party, but it came to a close second after the Spanish 
socialists (PSOE) (Conversi, 1997, 143). The PNV gained and maintained a hegemonic position within 
the political landscape. Since the creation of Basque autonomous region in 1978, the PNV has run the 
government, mostly in coalition. The PSOE is a center left party widely seen as the representation of 
interests of non-Basques and immigrants, who’s numbers were massively boosted after the great 
labor migrations in the 1950´s  and 60’s. These immigrants vote either PSOE or the other national 
party, the Partido Popular (PP)(MacClancy, 2007, 16).    
A key feature in recent Basque politics has thus been the formation of new nationalist parties 
challenging the PNV’s supremacy. This development contributed towards the articulation of the 
nationalist message among different political lines and competing ideologies. ETA has always been an 
important reason for these challenges. Due to its popularity and symbolic value, ETA became an 
inescapable point of reference for several groups, interest, unions and individuals who were seeking 
representation in the new democratic arena (Conversi, 1997, 161). 
Table A2 (Appendix) shows the elections results of Basque regional and general elections since 1977. 
The PNV is clearly the dominant party and has won almost every election since 1977. In Catalonia, 
the PSOE has always been the state-wide party who received the most support during elections. The 
Basque shows a different picture however, with both PSOE and PP swapping places as the biggest 
state-wide party (Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008, 66). However, Graph 2 shows that the accumulation 
of support for the several nationalist parties tends to be somewhat larger than the support for the 
several state-wide parties, especially during the first decade of the new Spanish democracy between 
1978 and 1990. In this sense, political support for Basque nationalism compared to state-wide parties 
is somewhat higher than support for Catalan nationalism compared to the state-wide parties in 
Catalan elections.  Table A2 also illustrates how Basque nationalism has been characterized by higher 
fragmentation than Catalan nationalism due to many competing nationalist parties since the first 
elections in 1977. 
However, during the 2009 elections, several of the smaller leftist nationalist parties were banned 
from competing in the Basque election because they were accused of having organizational ties with 
terrorist organization ETA. Thus for a few years, the state-wide parties gained more control in the 
Basque country (Fortes & Perez, 2013, 495-497). However, during the most recent elections in 2011 
and 2012, a new separatist and nationalist party called EH-Bildu entered both Basque and the 
Spanish Parliament (Table A2). EH-Bildu is a coalition of the former smaller parties, including Aralar, 
EA, ex-members of Herri Batasuna and ex-members of ETA’s political wing and can be characterized 
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as a pro-independence nationalist party on the left of the political specter. EH-BILDU was allowed to 
compete in the 2011 elections. With 24,7 % of the votes for the regional parliament in 2012 EH-Bildu 
has become serious competition for the PNV. But also the nationalist parties PNV and EH-Bildu now 
control almost 60% of the regional parliament (Fortes & Perez, 2013, 495-496). Graph 2 shows how 
the nationalist parties gain significantly more political support compared to the state-wide parties in 
the 2012 elections. 
Graph 2: Basque election results, total support for nationalist and state-wide parties in percentages of 
the total votes during regional and general elections. 
 
Basque nationalism thus continues to dominate the political agenda, with the PNV ideology as its 
disputed dominant ideology and radical nationalists still command a loyal minority. ETA also 
continues to lose support (MacClancy, 2007, 17). In October 2011, ETA spokespeople claimed that 
they had given up the armed fight. ETA declared it wanted to talk with the Spanish and French 
governments “with the aim of addressing the resolution of the consequences of the conflict and  
thus, to overcome the armed confrontation.” (The Economist, October 2011). The PNV, still the 
largest party in Basque politics, claimed that the nightmare was over. However, several people were 
still skeptical. ETA’s declaration neither meant dissolution or disarmament (Fortheringham, 2010). 
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6.3.3. Galicia 
 
For a long period, the Galleguismo movement didn’t represent the Galician population as a whole. It 
primarily was an urban based movement who couldn’t integrate the rural communities within the 
nationalist movement.  During the second republic nationalism became politically organized. In 
Galicia the Partido Galleguista was about to become a mass-movement in the 1930’s, representing 
nationalist feelings in Galicia. In 1936 it obtained 3 deputies for the Madrid parliament, counted 
more than 45000 members with an increasingly inter-class membership. The leadership represented 
a big part of the Galician intelligentsia (Núñez, 2007, 31). Franco however, effectively made an end to 
this progress. 
The Partido Galleguista was dissolved, and in the 1950s Galicianism fell under the influence of the 
theories held by one of its most prominent representatives, the philosopher Ramón Pineiro.  He 
produced a doctrine which aimed at overcoming nationalism and hence the claim of self-
determination.  He proposed an essentialist cultural doctrine which expected the 'cultural 
personality' of Galicia to survive (Núñez, 2007, 32). In the 1960´s, the first true nationalist parties 
where created: Partido Socialista Gallego and the Union do Pobo Gallego. Several social 
organizations and the Union do Pobo Gallego raised a common assembly platform founded in 
Northern Portugal in April 1975, the Galician National- Popular Assembly, Asamblea Nacional-
Popular Gallega (ANPG). The assembly was initially conceived as a non-party organization. It 
consisted of individual activists, who claimed to accept the principles of self-determination of the 
Galician people, self-government (without clearly stating its extent), anti-colonialism, democracy, the 
existence of properly Galician parties and the defense of the interests of 'the Galician working 
people´ (Núñez, 2007, 33).  
 
Only after the demise of Franco, Galicia again had the opportunity to create a role for itself and its 
language and try to get rid of its reputation of being a backward underdeveloped region in Spain.  
The transition towards a Spanish parliamentary monarchy presented another process of 
decentralization.  The 1978 Spanish constitution declared Castilian to be the official language but it 
also allowed co-officiality within several regions. The creation of an autonomous government in 
Galicia (Xunta) quickly followed and henceforth, Galician was to be the language employed in the 
political discourse in Galicia (Beswick, 2007, 72). The transition towards democracy within the 
Constitution of 1978, established Galicia along with Catalonia and the Basque Country as historic 
nationalities within the Spanish nation. 
 
44 
 
In 1977, the first parliamentary elections were held for the Galician Xunta. This quickly showed that  
 the position held by left-wing Galician nationalists enjoyed little social support: the PSG and the new 
political organization set up by the UPG and the ANPG, the Galician National-Popular Block, Bloque 
Nacional-Popular Gallego (BNPG) – received only 4.4% of the votes. In contrast, the Galician branch 
of the national Spanish socialist Party,   obtained three seats and support from urban voters. The rest 
of Galician seats in the Xunta were obtained by right-wing Spanish parties relying on a broad 
clientelistic network inherited from the Franco regime. From 1979 to 1989, Galician nationalists, 
although divided into several parties, maintained an electoral support between 12-15% (Núñez, 
2007, 36). The reasons for this relative weakness during the early years after the transition to 
democracy lie in the extreme fragmentation and instability of the political parties. The nationalist 
parties saw several splits and party changes along with a radicalization of nationalist demands. The 
Partido Popular was able to get significant support due to this fragmentation. This changed when the 
BNG became the sole surviving nationalist party and developed a very moderate discourse (Aguilar, 
2000, 320).  
 
The Bloque (BNG) is a coalition of parties, including traditional Marxist and communist parties, 
democrats, centrists and a variety of regionalist and nationalist parties. Its political line has been 
rather unclear and lacked a vision of Galicia’s place in Spain. However, during the last decades it has 
moderated its line on both socio economic position and the nationalist aspects and made huge 
political results (Keating, 2001, 229). In 1985, the BNG entered parliament for the first time. After 
1995 the BNG became the second largest political party in Galician politics and became the only 
nationalist force in Galicia, concentrating on an electorate of around 24% of the votes, which had 
previously been scattered among several nationalist parties (Maiz, 2003, 20-21).  
 
After the instalment of the regional Xunta, polices were implemented which reinforced and created 
economic centers that were previously damaged or non-existent. Regional institutions promoted 
Galician culture, language and educational systems. Infrastructure was created to promote the idea 
of Galleguismo through new public media such as Television.  Galician oriented programs promoted 
and cultivated identity markers symbols and myths of the Galician identity through music and 
recovery of the national history. Al these factors helped to create or reinforce a perception of 
belonging and a collective identity which had not previously existed. This galleguismo and sense of 
collective identity was however largely dual and overlapping. It was both Spanish and Galician. Maiz 
argues that due to the fact that the BNG among other parties acted within this framework, it was 
much easier to compete for the Galician electoral support. This is a part of the explanation for the 
recuperation of Galician support for nationalist movement in the late 1990’s (Maiz, 2003, 22-23). 
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Table A3 (Appendix) shows the elections results in Galician general and regional elections. Since 1989 
the BNG is the only nationalist party in Galician politics representing the nationalist movement. 
However, the BNG seems to gain substantially more votes during regional elections than during 
national elections. Just as in Catalonia, the Galician nationalist voter thus approaches elections for 
regional or national parliament  differently. The BNG and PSOE swapped places as second and third 
party between 1997 and 2004 (Perez-Nieves and Bonet, 2008, 67). Next to the nationalist BNG, the 
state-wide parties PP and PSOE dominate the elections, just as they do in the Spanish parliament. 
Graph 3 shows that support for the state-wide parties in Galician elections is however always much 
higher than support for the nationalist parties. Therefore, Galicia scores low on the indicator of 
political mobilization. 
 
Graph 3: Galician election results, total support for nationalist and state-wide parties in percentages 
of the total votes during regional and general elections. 
 
 
The last decades have clearly showed a modernization of Galician political context. The political 
realm has increasingly been Galicianized. Nowadays  all the political forces, even the non-Galicianist 
ones, assume a discourse of differentiation and use of the Galician language. Maiz and Losada state 
there is a common 'master frame' within contemporary Galician politics shared both by nationalists 
and non-nationalists  of defense of the Galician culture and language (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 88).  
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The Catalans where most successful in mobilizing support for the nationalist movement based on a 
gradual process of state-less nation building. Although divided over several parties, there wasn’t 
fragmentation in Catalan politics between nationalist and national parties, or increasing tensions 
between moderate nationalists and separatists. The Catalans and Basques both score high on the 
political support indicator. Nationalist parties play a significant role in both regional and general 
election as shown in tables A1 and A2. The Basques however  are characterized by a history of 
fragmentation among parties and within. ETA is of course the clearest example of the way in which 
this fragmentation became very extreme. The Galicians were initially fragmented among regional and 
national parties, but the BNG quickly became the only nationalist party in parliament, representing 
about 25% of the Galician electorate. Galician nationalist parties are more successful in regional 
elections than in general election. However, depending on the type of elections, the Galician 
nationalist BNG can count on between 10 to 25 percent of the total votes, which is significantly lower 
than the Catalans and the Basques (Table A3). 
Table 1 presents a summary of the success of the three nationalist movements within the different 
indicators. 
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Table 1 
Differences in success 
 
Catalans Basques Galicians 
Language Language is the most 
important bastion of 
Catalan identity.  
 
Language is 
widespread among the 
population and 
education is effectively 
organized to sustain 
and promote its use. 
 
Catalan language is 
associated with 
upward mobility. 
Language has always 
been a stumbling block 
for Basque 
nationalism.  
 
Euskara is a hard 
language and wasn’t 
standardized until 
1960.  
 
Hostility towards 
Basque language from 
important elements in 
society. 
 
Galician is the only 
minority language in 
Spain spoken by the 
entire population, but 
its social status 
remains low.  
 
 
 
Rural/urban divide: 
Galician is used more 
among lower classes, 
in the countryside and 
informal settings. 
Print capitalism The Renaixença 
produced a variety of 
literature which served 
as a driving force for 
nationalist sentiments.  
 
Education is very 
strong in Catalan 
nationalism. 
 
Very few Basque 
writers and 
productions in 
Euskara.  
 
 
Education was 
organized late.  
The use of Galician in 
all written 
communication is still 
very small.  
 
Education was 
organized late. 
Regional government 
still not very active to 
promote Galician 
 
Political support for 
nationalist parties 
High support for 
nationalist parties 
depending on type of 
election, but not 
significantly higher 
than support for state-
wide parties.  
High support for 
nationalist parties, 
during both regional 
and general elections. 
Swapping between 
higher support for 
state-wide parties and 
nationalist parties 
 
Support for the 
nationalist party BNG 
is rising but remains 
significantly lower than 
support for the state-
wide parties. Also 
dependent on type of 
elections 
Political 
fragmentation 
Two dominant parties, 
CiU and ERC. ERC is 
more separatist but 
also non-violent. 
High political 
fragmentation, several 
nationalist parties 
competing for support. 
Since 1985 only one 
nationalist party: BNG.  
 
State-wide PP and 
PSOE dominate 
Galician politics 
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7. Discussion: explaining differences in strength and cohesiveness 
 
Table 2:  
 Relative Success in recent decades 
Catalans Basques Galicians 
Language High  Low  Medium  
Print capitalism High  Low  Medium  
Political fragmentation medium High  low 
Support for subnational parties High High  low 
 
The preceding empirical analyses has presented us with several significant differences in strength 
and cohesiveness of the three nationalist movements of this study. Table 2 shows the relative 
strengths of the three movements in the different indicators. Based on table 2 we can identify 
several sub-questions to explain the main differences based on the discussed theories in previous 
sections about the construction of national identity, nationalist discourse and symbolic frameworks: 
- Why are language and print capitalism such  weak forces in driving Basque nationalism? 
- What explains the low support and low subnational mobilization of Galician nationalism? 
- Why are Basque nationalist parties increasingly fragmented while Catalan and Galician 
parties are not? 
 
7.1. National identity 
 
Looking at the construction of national identity, the preceding case descriptions have showed how 
Catalan, Basque and Galician identity where based on very different elements. The historical analysis 
shows how Catalan nationalism was based on Language and culture, Basque nationalism was based 
on the notion of a distinct and separate race and Galician nationalism had a dominant linguistic basis. 
These common elements chosen as core values can work both as mobilizing symbols and as a point 
of reference for a wide platform. This was the case in Catalan Nationalism. Conversi (1997) argues 
that within Basque society, the lack of available cultural markers like language forced the nationalist 
leaders to look for other instruments of identity formation and consolidation.  In this case, the group 
was bound to rely on an antagonistic identity. Such an identity is constructed essentially through the 
opposition of the in-groups to one or more out-groups. This antagonistic identity focuses more on 
the need to define one’s own identity trough negative comparisons to others, which results in its 
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exclusive character (Conversi, 1997, 5). Basque nationalism lacked a clearly identified core element 
since an ethnic language was scarcely spoken.  Catalan nationalism was greatly provided with lively 
rich and widespread language.  This became the core element of Catalan nationalism from the very 
beginning, while Basque nationalism had to create a core element (Conversi, 1997, 162). 
Consequently, Catalan mobilization was based on a positive assertion of the group’s culture. This 
positive assertion of the group’s culture in turn was based on the idea of a separate language and 
culture, while Basque mobilization was based on negation and confrontation based on ethnic identity 
(Conversi, 1997, 262). 
A Basque language did not exist, nor a widely excepted cultural tradition. Arana had to design 
everything. His choice for race as a collective identity was necessary for the success of Basque 
nationalism. Because Arana almost singlehandedly enforced Basque nationalism (Edles, 1999, 322-
324), he had to make a clear separation based on race to be able to identify the Basque nation. This 
top-down creation of Basque nationalism provided its exclusive character from the very beginning 
(Nili,  2009, 253). During the creation of Basque nationalism, Language has thus never been a driving 
force, but as Payne  (1971, 38)  states, “a stumbling block”, which only prevented Basque nationalism 
from further development.  Basque literature productions were also very small compared to the 
Catalans. Language never was, and never became one of the core elements of Basque identity, while 
for the Catalans and Galicians, the idea of a distinct language and culture were the basis for the very 
emergence of nationalism.  
In the nineteenth century, a variety of cultural nationalism had emerged in Galicia, based primarily 
on the reality of a distinct regional language, Galician, very similar to Portuguese. Unlike Catalonia or 
The Basque country however, Galicia was a background agrarian region with no industry or general 
education or self-consciousness (Keating, 2001, 226; Beswick, 2007, 61). Galicianism therefore was a 
kind of vague doctrine, promoted mainly by a small middle class and elite (Payne, 1971, 42). The core 
element within Galician nationalism  was the reality of a distinct language, but the Galician identity 
lacked self-consciousness. The goal of Galician nationalism has always been to dignify the use of its 
language (Beswick, 2007,65). The reality of a distinct language was thus the main common element 
of Galician identity, but the fact that the language was evaluated as a negative social threat 
prevented the development of a strong common element and a strong collective identity, which in 
turn prevented the nationalist movement from a successful development.  
Language and Print capitalism are relatively stronger in Catalan and Galician nationalism, because 
language and culture were the core elements of their identity. This explains why language and print 
capitalism are such strong indicators in Catalan nationalism. They were the very basis for their 
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identification as a sub nation.  Within Basque nationalism, Language was present, but never reached 
the same mobilizing effect through Print capitalism and cultural expressions because it never was an 
essential part of Basque identity. Religion and ethnicity were the bastions of Basque identity from 
the very beginning. This choice for race and religion was made by creator of Basque nationalism, 
Arana, but next to the idea of Race and religion, language and Print capitalism were never able to  
become driving forces of the Basque identity.  
For Galician nationalism, language was the main part of their identification as a sub nation. We 
therefore would expect high scores on both language and Print capitalism. However, due to the low 
social status of both the language and Galicia as a region, which still plays a role in the 21st century, 
Galician identity never reached the levels of pride and confidence as can be found within Catalan 
identity. Their only element of national identity, namely language, was at the same time their biggest 
problem, due to its low social status. This explains the relatively lower scores in language and print 
capitalism. 
 
7.2. Nationalist discourse 
 
The Renaixença introduced nationalist feelings bottom-up. First it created support among the people 
and in the streets. After these feelings became salient, political organization was the logical next 
step. The Catalan Renaixença was not only a linguistic, but also a cultural revival which started 
around 1800. With Carlese Aribau’s nostalgic poem “Oda a la patria”, the Renaixença restarted the 
Catalan literary traditions and helped to standardize the Catalan language (Edles, 1999, 317). Within 
the context of this cultural and linguistic revival, the nationalist movement emerged in the late 19th 
century. The Renaixença was a popular revolution, because it was initially started by intellectuals and 
artists, but gradually the Renaixença became accessible for a wider audience, creating a large 
popular base of support for the nationalist movement. 
Its emergence based on language ensured the inclusive character because the focus on language and 
culture made it possible for non-original Catalans to be included. The identification of the ethnic 
distinctiveness of Catalan people was never necessary to make them feel connected as a group.  Due 
to its inclusive character and focus on language and culture, civic elements are dominant within 
Catalan nationalist discourse. 
Arana singlehandedly designed the first political program of the Basque nationalist movement, came 
up with the current name of the Basque country, stated the boundaries of this new country, wrote its 
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anthem and designed its flag (Nili, 2009, 252). Basque nationalism was thus created, introduced and 
guided by a single spiritual leader who determined its ideology and attitudes. In this process, the only 
possible collective identity Arana could find to underpin his nationalist ideology was the fact that 
long ago, the Basque people were a distinct race. This led to an exclusive character and the 
dominance of ethnic elements in Basque nationalist discourse. 
A striking difference between the nationalist movements is that inclusion through the teachings of 
Catalan language was an important element in their attitude towards migrants, while in the Basque 
country, language was used for the opposite. As Nili states, language merely functioned for 
exclusionary purposes (Nili, 2009, 252). “Arana’s chief cultural goal was not to spread Euskara but to 
prevent foreigners from knowing it” (Nili, 2009, 253). The exclusive nature of Basque nationalism was 
also accompanied by a centrality of religion as another element of Arana’s ideology, compounding 
racial and religious ”Salvation”(Nili, 2009, 253). Catalan and Galician language thus spread among the 
population and in case of the Catalans even among immigrants due to its inclusive character, while 
the Basques tried to prevent immigrants from learning their language.  
These differences in inclusive and exclusive nationalist discourse explain why Catalanism gradually 
grew based on an expanding linguistic and cultural community and why Language and Print 
capitalism are much stronger in Catalan nationalism. Its dominant inclusive character provided the 
basis a gradual process of stateless nation-building in which language and cultural expression were 
the main driving forces for Catalan nationalism (Conversi, 1997, 140; Hargreaves, 2000, 21). The 
exclusive character of Basque nationalism explains the weakness in Language and Print capitalism. 
Basque teachings were used for exclusionary purposes to distinguish between in and out-groups. 
Language and Print capitalism were never used to unify al people in the Basque region, but to create 
a clear separation between Basques and non-Basques.   
Galician nationalism initially knew an exclusive discourse focused on a framework of Galician 
nationalism against Spanish nationalism. This framework was characterized by an anti-institutional 
and disruptive mobilization strategy (Maiz, 2003, 21). This exclusive focus was largely tempered 
when Galician nationalism started to strive for both Galician and Castilian to become the official 
languages. However, as described in previous sections, although Galician nationalist discourse 
became more moderate and more inclusive, the spread of Language and Print capitalism never 
reached the same amount as within Catalan nationalism. 
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7.3. Symbolic expressions 
Laura Desfor Edles focuses on the cultural developments to explain differences in both nationalist 
movements. She focuses on symbolic nationalist frameworks. Within the Catalan cultural and 
symbolic framework she finds a lot of feelings of modernism while the “Basque nationalist 
symbolization was inherently volatile” (Edles, 1999, 325). 
During the process of the establishment of a new Spanish constitution in 1978, Edles finds that the 
two nationalist movements adopted different strategies towards the Spanish central government. 
The Catalan were looking for consensus and embraced the process of negotiations and the 
establishment of a constitution and a new central government, but the Basques didn’t. Edles explains 
these differences based on the symbolic frameworks. For Catalan nationalism, core symbols of their 
nationalist discourse were democracy, Europeanization and pragmatism. Catalanism was thus very 
modern. It aimed for reconciliation and politics of consensus, which allowed the elites to negotiate 
with the central state, without the risk of losing face. The Catalan symbolic framework towards the 
negotiations for the new Spanish constitution didn’t threaten the Catalan identity (Edles, 1999, 339). 
Basque nationalist on the other hand, were working in an ambiguous nationalistic symbolic 
framework. Therefore compromise with centralist elites would be dangerously close to 
compromising Basque identity (Edles, 1999, 340). This ambiguous framework explains why the 
Basques have always been separated between parties who were willing to cooperate with the 
Spanish national government and those parties who still proclaimed that the Basques should be 
completely separate. This ambiguous framework can be traced back all the way to Arana, who left a 
legacy of contradiction after his dead, creating a fruitful base for this ambiguous framework to 
emergence and for future Basque political fragmentation.  
As Barreto states: Galician culture is always on the edge, complaining about everything, and of course 
it does not make any long-term plans, as it expects to die soon (Barreto, 2011, 385). Barreto 
described how Galician nationalism has become a nationally and politically ambiguous identity 
suspended between reality and fiction. Galician identity is characterized by the period of 
Rexurdimento (The revival). Galicia’s ability to remain a vital force has relied on an ability to make 
seemingly dead symbolic expressions like monuments and Celtic folklore come to life once more. 
This practice of resurrection continued into the new millennium (Barreto, 2011, 388).  
Galician nationalism however  lacks a historic institutional base. While the Basques have their history 
of the Fueros and Catalans have their  Generalität, Galicia presents a peculiar historic political-
institutional deficit.  The early inclusion of Galicia within the monarchy and the Spanish centralist 
State resulted in a lack of historical precedents in self-government. Galicians thus have no historical 
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memories of an ancient period of self-rule.  Consequently, the Galicians have no symbolic basis for  a 
discourse about a lost period of self-determination, on which demands for autonomy could be based 
(Maiz and Losada, 2000, 65). Therefore, the reality of a distinct language has always been the only 
common element in Galician identity. As explained in the previous sections, the spread of Galician 
language was however prevented by the central government and the fact that Galician became a 
negative social threat. Galician nationalism therefore never reached high levels of political 
mobilization, nor a strong Language or Print capitalism indicator. 
 
7.3.1. After the civil war: national memories of repression 
The three nationalist movements also survived the civil war and the Franco regime in very different 
ways. For the Basque nation, the civil war entailed a period of the destruction of Basque nationalist 
symbols, destruction and repression. The only memory the Basque nation has about this period is 
one of horrible repression. The Catalans on the other hand also suffered horribly, but after the civil 
war, three new sacred symbols were melded to Catalan nationalism: The notion of a modern, 
legitimate autonomous government (1932 Generalität), a national Hero (Macia, first president of the 
Generalität) and a national martyr (Luis Companys, president of the Generalität) (Edles, 1999, 326-
327). As Edles states: The cruelty of the Basque country was that it  constricted even the possibility for 
illusion” (Edles, 199 327). A lot of Basque national symbols were destroyed and there was nothing 
that the Basque people could hold on to and turn into a heroic story of a Basque national hero during 
the civil war.  
The Galicians also faced repression, but slightly less, because Franco was not as aggressive against his 
homeland as against the Catalans and Basques (Beswick, 2007, 69). Galician nationalism was in the 
process of becoming a mass movement when Franco entered en stopped this development. The 
Galicians therefore experienced less destruction, because there was simply less to destroy. They 
focused on cultural resistance (Nunez Seixas, 2000, 316). Also, Franco implemented several economic 
policies to strengthen the agrarian economy of the region in which he was born (Kern, 1990, 234). 
The civil war and Franco’s dictatorship were also a dark page in Galician history, but it didn’t leave 
the same scars as in Catalonia and the Basque Country.  The nationalist movements thus survived the 
civil war in very different ways. For The Catalans it meant another contribution of beautiful story’s 
about Catalan heroes to their already wealthy culture and history. For the Basques, there was 
nothing more than cruelty and suffering. For the Galicians, it represents a last and successful 
resurrection.  
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After the dead of Arana and Franco’s oppression of the Basque identity, action against the central 
government had taken the place of race as a core element of the Basque national movement. With 
every violent act of repression from Madrid, support for ETA grew. ETA established a civil religion of 
violence (Nili, 2009, 253). ETA’s strategy was to  create a spiral of mass rebellion and eventually civil 
war and Basque secession (Edles, 1999, 335).  
Muro argues that in radical Basque nationalism, the politics of war memory are characterized by the 
inclusion of facts that the national political elites thought to be worth remembering in order to 
portray the recent past as an unambiguous story of moral success. The main purpose of the politics 
of war memory was to strengthen the emotional bonds of the radical community by identifying the 
heroes and villains of the old Basque drama. The radical Basque nationalists glorify the sacrifice of 
ETA militants. They see the cycle of political violence as the last stage in the long-term conflict 
between Basques and Spaniards.  They define the hardship endured by young Basques as a form of 
political martyrdom in order to maintain popular support for its violent campaign and provide a 
powerful symbol for new militants. Due to this idea of martyrdom, the arrest or death of an ETA 
militant is no longer  considered a defeat, but an example of symbolic power. Radical Basque 
nationalist used this symbol of power as a resource to generate strong emotions for  what they 
consider as a ‘good cause’ and recruit new members (Muro, 2009, 675-676). 
 
Basque nationalist thus claim that  the memory of the civil war was most dramatic for the Basque 
nation. The war was more destructive and political reprisals were harder, both during the war and in 
the post-war period as well. However, Aguilar (2007) argues, that ,leaving aside the bombing of 
Guernica and a few other disastrous episodes, the destruction in the Basque country during the civil 
war was less than the destruction in other areas, and survival of the nationalist movement after the 
war was not as difficult as for example in Galicia. The reason that the memory of the civil is so 
traumatic for the Basque nation is  because of the nature of the struggle. The Basque and Navarrese 
territories were divided between those who fought for the Francoist forces being supporters of the 
Republic, and nationalist partisans being against the republic. This gives the conflict an even greater 
moral resonance, since it suggests the symbolic rupture of a natural collective identity, namely the 
Basque nation (Aguilar, 2007, 19-22). 
 
After 1960 Aguilar sees a greater level of repression by the dictatorship in the Basque Country. This 
became especially brutal due to the emergence of ETA. From that point onwards, the Basque country 
was subject to many states of exception and extra countermeasures against terrorism.  At the time of 
Franco's death, the Basque country had the largest prison population. ETA was thus allowed to 
perpetuate the myth that they were continuing the war that began in 1936 between Basques and 
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Spaniards (Aguilar, 2007, 21-22). Thus according to Aguilar, the civil war was not perceived as a war 
against dictator Franco, but as a struggle fought against a common foreign enemy: the Spanish state 
as  a whole. Francisco Letamendia, a radical nationalist and member of the PNV stated: “the Civil War 
continues to be seen as a fight of national resistance against a foreign occupier” (Aguilar, 2007, 15-
16).  Altogether  this led to a higher  sense of suppression in the Basque Country and in turn led to a 
higher feeling of regional nationalism in favor of secessionism. The forces for secessionism clashed 
with the more moderate Nationalist forces in Basque nationalism, which increased the amount of 
political fragmentation.  
 
Already in the 1950’s and 60’s  a small degree of permissiveness was displayed towards the regional 
Galician language by the Franco regime. Although there was a renewed interest in the language, the 
teachings of Galician were still forbidden (Beswick, 2007, 70-71). Only after the demise of Franco, the 
Galicians had the opportunity to finally engage in the last process of resurrection and really create a 
role for itself. The transition towards democracy gave Galicia the chance to get rid of its reputation as 
an agrarian backward region, an co-officiality was established for both the Galician and the Castilian 
language. The creation of an autonomous government in Galicia (Xunta) quickly followed and 
henceforth, Galician was to be the language employed in the political discourse in Galicia (Beswick, 
2007, 72). The end of the civil war and the transition of democracy for the Galician meant the last 
resurrection towards the first real and concrete results. While for the Basques the civil war and 
Franco are mostly  symbols of destruction and repression, the Galician also look back at their final 
successful resurrection. 
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8. Concluding remarks: past and future 
 
Based on a historical approach, this thesis showed how differences emerged in several indicators of 
relative success and how these differences influence the ways in which the three nationalist 
movements represent a strong and cohesive nationalist movement in recent decades. 
This thesis has described how several of the major differences in success between the three historical 
nationalities in Spain and their nationalist movements can be explained based on theoretical 
arguments concerning the construction of national identity, the nationalist discourse and symbolic 
frameworks.  However, this theoretical framework didn’t include several alternative explanations for 
the differences in success. Globalization and the continuing integration through the European Union 
could have had a significant impact on the developments of the three movements for example.  This 
thesis also didn’t include explanations based on structural and economic arguments. Both Medrano 
(1994) and Keating (2001) implement economic arguments to explain differences between the 
Spanish subnational movements.    
 
In short,  Language and Print capitalism were very  weak forces in Basque nationalism because 
language never was an essential element of Basque identity. Catalan and Galician nationalism on the 
other adopted language and culture as the basis of their national identity from the very beginning. 
Race and religion were the main driving forces for Basque nationalism. This explains why both 
Language and Print capitalism where always a problem for Basque nationalism. 
 
However, Galician nationalism always knew lower support and lower subnational mobilization than 
the Catalans and Basques. This can be explained due to the fact that the main element of Galician 
nationalism, namely language, never developed in a way to become the driving force in the Galician 
identification. Galician nationalism lacks a historical precedent of ancient self-rule on which demands 
for autonomy could be based. Catalan nationalism gradually grew with a stable linguistic and cultural 
basis which resulted in an inclusive discourse and the gradual spread of nationalism. 
The Basque nationalist parties were much more fragmented than Catalan and Galician parties. This 
can be explained based on the ambiguous framework and the Basque nationalist discourse. Sabino 
de Arana y Goiri left a legacy of contradictions within the original Basque nationalist ideology. The 
cruelty of the civil war provided a fruitful basis for support for secessionism and a much more 
aggressive nationalist movement. These forces clashed with the moderate Basque nationalists 
resulting in ongoing tensions between moderate and separatist forces within Basque nationalism. For 
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the Catalans and Galicians, the civil war and the Franco regime were not only a period of destruction, 
but also positive memories could be added to the Catalan cultural heritage and for the Galicians, it 
meant the last successful resurrection.  
However, sub-state nationalism is a social construct based on imaginations of people and therefore 
constantly subject to change. Recent developments in all three movements show that their future 
and the stability of Spanish democracy is still uncertain. Catalan nationalism has recently evolved 
away from its historic demand for increased federalism in Spain towards a more unbalanced 
nationalist demand. The emergence of this unbalanced Catalan nationalism can be explained by the 
weakening of integrative nationalism in favor of independentism (Petithomme and Fernández, 2013, 
3). The once hegemonic position of autonomist nationalism, represented by the CiU under the Jordi 
Pujol governments, is now greatly enfeebled. Catalan politics is becoming more characterized by 
greater fragmentation, the weakening of autonomist nationalism and the reinforcement of 
independentist feelings (Petithomme and Fernández, 2013, 17). 
The Galician political scene is still full of uncertainties and open ended questions for all the political 
forces, especially in a national political context where the Catalan and Basque nationalist forces have 
demonstrated great capacity to obtain resources and areas of power from the central government . 
The rapid growth of the BNG (25%) as a nationalist force on the Left and its process of program 
moderation imply challenges in discovering the limits of these processes. The question is to what 
extent the BNG can react to the changing political landscape (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 88). 
In the Basque country there had been up to 10 declarations of "temporary" ceasefire by ETA since 
1981. The Basque interior minister claimed that the last statement in 2011 was "insufficient" 
(Fortheringham, 2010). Up until the completion of this thesis there haven’t been any assaults by ETA 
and we can thus claim they uphold the ceasefire declaration. However, ETA remains to represent 
demands for complete Basque independence, since they stated to keep on the political struggle for  
“the recognition of the Basque country and the respect for the will of the people (which) should 
prevail over imposition.” This essentially meant that ETA will try to use the little weight it still has to 
aim for self-determination or any variant of more autonomy. Since the Spanish constitution however 
does not allow this, there is still the possibility of conflict between the moderate PNV and the more 
radical Basque nationalists (The Economist, October 2011).  
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10. Appendix 
 
Table A1: Catalan elections results 
Year 
 
 
 
CiU ERC SI Total 
nationalist 
parties 
PSC-
PSO
E 
PSUC 
/IC 
AP/ 
PP 
UCD
/CDS 
PS
A 
C-
PD
C 
C 
up 
Total 
state-
wide  
parties 
1977 
g 
16.9 4.6  21.5 28.4 18.2 3.5 16.8    66.9 
1979
g 
16.2 4.1  20.3 29.3 17.1 3.6 9.1    59.1 
1980 
r 
27.9 8.9  36.8 22.5 18.8 2.4 0.6    47 
1982
g 
22.5 4  26.5 45.8 4.6 14.6 2 2.7   67.5 
1984 
r 
46.8 4.4  50.4 33.1 5.6 7.7 - 0.5   46.2 
1986
g 
32 2.7  34.7 41 3.9 11.4 4.1    60.2 
1988 
r 
45.7 4.1  50.1 29.8 7.8 5.3 3.8    46.7 
1989
g 
32.7 2.7  35.4 35.6 7.3 10.6 4.3    57.7 
1992 
r 
46.2 8  54.2 27.6 6.5 6 0.9    41 
1993
g 
31.8 5.1  36.9 34.9 7.5 17 0.8    60.2 
1995 
r 
41 9.5  50.5 24.8 9.7 13.1 -    47.6 
1996
g 
29.6 4.2  33.8 39.4 7.8 18 -    65.2 
1999 
r 
37.7 8.7  46.4 37.8 3.9 9.5 -    51.3 
2000
g 
28.8 5.6  34.4 34.1 2.2 22.8     59.1 
2003 
r 
30.9 16.4  47.3 31.1 7.3 11.9     50.3 
2004
g 
20.8 15.9  36.3 39.5 5.8 15.5     60.8 
2006 
r 
31.5 14  45.5 26.8 9.5 10.6   3.0  49.9 
2008 
g 
20.9 7.8  28.7 45.4 4.9 16.4     66.7 
2010 
r 
38.4 7 3.3 48.7 18.4 7.4 12.4   3.4  41.6 
2011 
g 
29.3 7.1  36.4 26.7 8.1 20.7     55.5 
2012 
r 
30.7 13.7  44.4 14.4 9.9 13   7.6 3.5 48.4 
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Table A1: Election results from general (g) and regional  (r) elections in Catalonia in percentages of 
total votes. 
Sources: own elaboration from table A.1 in Santiago Perez-Nievas and Eduard Bonet (2008) and 
http://www.electionresources.org/   
Note: only parties who obtained seats in in the regional or general parliament are included in the 
table. Therefore the sum of nationalist and state-wide parties does not add up to 100 %, since 
several parties received votes, but didn’t gain seats in parliament.  
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Table A2: Basque election results 
 
Year PNV EA EE HB-
EH-
Bata
suna 
EH-
Bildu 
Total 
nationalist 
parties 
UCD PSO
E-EE 
AP 
/PP 
IU UA Total 
state-
wide 
parties 
1977
g 
29.4  6.1   35.5 12.8 26.6 7.1   46.5 
1979
g 
27.6  8 15  50.6 16.9 19.1    36 
1980 
r 
38.1  9.8 16.5  64.4  14.2 4.8   19 
1982
g 
31.9  7.7 14.8  54.4  29.3 11.7   41 
1984 
r 
42  8 14.7  64.7  23.1 9.4   32.5 
1986 
r 
23.6 15.8 10.8 17.4  67.6  22 4.8   26.8 
1986
g 
27.8  9.1 17.7  54.6  26.3 10.5   36.8 
1989
g 
22.9 11.2 8.9 17  60  21.3 9.4 3  37.2 
1990 
r 
28.5 11.4  18.3  66  19.9 8.2 1.4 1.4 31.9 
1993
g 
24.4 10  14.8  49.2  24.9 14.9 6.4  47 
1994 
r 
29.8 10.3  16.3  56.4  17.1 14.4 9.2 2.7 43.4 
1996
g 
25.4 8.4  12.5  46.3  24 18.6 9.4  52 
1998 
r 
28 8.7  17.9  54.6  17.6 20.1 5.7 1.3 44.7 
2000
g 
31.3 7.8    39.1  24 29.2 5.6  58.8 
2001 
r 
42.7 -  10.1  52.8  17.9 23.1 5.6 - 46.6 
2004
g 
34.2 6.6    44  27.6 19.2 8.4  55.2 
2005 
r 
38.7 -  12.5  53.5  22.7 17.4 5.4 0.4 45.9 
2008
g 
27.1 4.5    31.6  38.1 18.5 4.5  61.1 
2009 
r 
38.1 3.6    41.7  30.2 13.9   44.1 
2011
g 
27.4    19.2 46.6  21.6 17.8 3.7  43.1 
2012 
r 
34.2    24.7 58.9  18.9 11.6 2.7  33.2 
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Table A2: Election results from general (g) and regional  (r) elections in The Basque country in 
percentages of total votes. 
Sources: own elaboration from table A.2 and table A.3 in Santiago Perez-Nievas and Eduard Bonet 
(2008) and http://www.electionresources.org/  
Note: only parties who obtained seats in in the regional or general parliament are included in the 
table. Therefore the sum of nationalist and state-wide parties does not add up to 100 %, since 
several parties received votes, but didn’t gain seats in parliament. 
In 2001 and 2005 PNV and EA formed and electoral coalition. 
Batasuna was outlawed in 2002 and couldn’t participate in 2004 and 2005. One week before the 
2005 election, Batasuna leadership endorsed the legal candidacy of PCTV and called on its electorate 
to vote PCTV. This party gained 12.5 % of the votes. 
In 2001, PP and UA formed an electoral coalition. 
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Table A3: Galician elections results 
Year BNG Other EU-
ANOVA 
Total 
nationalist 
parties 
PP PSOE IU Total 
state-
wide 
parties 
1989 
r 
8 7.4  15.4 44 32.7  76.7 
1993 
g 
8 4.5  12.5 47.1 36 4.7 87.8 
1993 
r 
18.7 2.5  21.2 52.5 23.5 3.1 79.1 
1996 
g 
12.8 1.8  14.6 48.3 33.5 3.6 85.4 
1997 
r 
25.5 2.7  28.2 51.5 19.4 0.9 71.8 
2000 
g 
19.1   19.1 53.8 23.4 1.3 78.5 
2001 
r 
22.6   22.6 51.6 21.8 - 73.4 
2004 
g 
11.3   11.3 47.1 37.1 1.7 85.9 
2005 
r 
18.8   18.8 45.2 33.1  78.3 
2008 
g 
11.5   11.5 43.9 40.6 1.4 85.9 
2009 
r 
16   16 46.7 31  77.7 
2011 
g 
11.2   11.2 52.5 27.8  80.3 
2012 
r 
10.1  13.9 24 45.8 20.6  66.4 
 
Table A3: Election results from general (g) and regional  (r) elections in Galicia in percentages of total 
votes. 
Sources: own elaboration from table A.4 in Santiago Perez-Nievas and Eduard Bonet (2008) and 
http://www.electionresources.org/  
Note: only parties who obtained seats in in the regional or general parliament are included in the 
table. Therefore the sum of nationalist and state-wide parties does not add up to 100 %, since 
several parties received votes, but didn’t gain seats in parliament.  
From 1979 to 1989, Galician nationalists, although divided into several parties, maintained an 
electoral support between 12-15% (Núñez, 2007, 36). Due to large fragmentation and minimal 
influence of these several parties, this table starts with elections results from 1989. 
